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Termination of Public School
Desegregation: Determination of





In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) 1 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that state-imposed racial segregation of public schools 2 de-
prives African-Americans of equal protection of the laws under the
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. B.S., 1978, Indi-
ana University; J.D., 1982, Yale University. The author would like to acknowledge and
express his appreciation to the many colleagues and other friends whose support and
suggestions have been so valuable to this Article. Special thanks are due to Professors
John Baker, Patrick Baude, Paulette Caldwell, Richard Fraher, and Dean Bryant Garth,
Lynne Henderson, Martha Minnow, Lauren Robel, and John Scanlan for their insightful
and helpful comments. The author would also like to acknowledge the helpful com-
ments received from participants at the annual Law & Society Conference held in June
1989, where an earlier version of this Article was presented. Finally the author would
like to thank John Dayton and Clarence Pollard for their exceptionally fine research
assistance, and Indiana University and its School of Law for the financial support they
provided for this work.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. The scope of this Article is limited to the discussion of de jure segregation in
public elementary and secondary schools; de jure segregation in higher education is
beyond its purview. The term "public schools" as used in this Article, therefore, refers
only to elementary and secondary schools and the term "public education" refers only
to education in public elementary and secondary schools.
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Fourteenth Amendment.3 With Brown I and its school desegrega-
tion progeny, the Supreme Court launched the nation on a course
intended to desegregate its public schools. Over thirty-five years
later, even though de jure segregation 4 of public school students
has been replaced by de facto segregation in many areas of the
country,5 federal courts at both the district and the appellate levels
are looking at school districts under court supervision with a new set
of issues.
Lower federal courts frequently address the question of whether a
school district in which de jure desegregation is found to exist
satisfies its obligation under Brown I and its progeny; 6 that is, has it
3. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
4. The Supreme Court defined the constitutional violation of segregated public
schools as "dejure" segregation. According to the Supreme Court, dejure segregation
is "a current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action directed
specifically to the [segregated] schools." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 205-
06 (1973).
5. As one commentator noted, many cities, including northern cities such as " 'Chi-
cago, St. Louis, and Cleveland were almost as segregated as they would have been if a
law mandated that all blacks live in exclusively black blocks and whites in exclusively
whites ones.'" B. BLAUNER, BLACK LIvEs, WHrrIE LIVEs 165 (1989) (citation omitted).
As a result, "in many cities 'black and white students go to separate schools, just as they
did when 'separate but equal' was the guiding principle.'"
In Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 585-87 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the district court
concluded that there were too few white students enrolled in Detroit's public schools to
relieve segregation. At that time white students comprised 36.2% of Detroit's 1970
public school enrollment of 289,743 students. Id at 585-86. The implication of these
statistics is that not all school systems can be de facto desegregated.
According to figures published by the United States Department of Education for
1984, 9 of the 10 largest school districts in the United States do not have as large a
percentage of white students as there were in Detroit in 1970. These districts include
the following:
1. New York City, NY 22.8%
2. Los Angeles, CA 19.7%o
3. Chicago, IL 13.1o
4. Dade County (Miami), FL 26.6o
5. Philadelphia, PA 25.4%
6. Detroit, MI 10.4%
7. Houston, TX 19.0%0
8. Hawaii, HI 23.1o
9. Dallas, TX 23.3o
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, OFFICE OF EDUCATION RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 179 (1987)
[hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION STUDY]. There are a number of other metropol-
itan school districts, such as Atlanta, Newark, Hartford, Baltimore, and Memphis, where
the contingent of white students would make meaningful desegregation of students im-
practicable. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 1980s: TRENDS IN THE STATES AND METRO-
PoLrrAN AREAS, A REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PROJECT TO THE
JOINT CENTER FOR POLrICAL STUDIES, Table 7 (G. Orfield, F. Monfort & R. George eds.
1987).
6. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 665-66 (10th Cir. 1990);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 859 (10th Cir. 1989) (Brown); Dowell v. Board
of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, I10 S. Ct. 1521 (1990);
Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate School Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1174-77 (5th Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Nucci, 831
F.2d 313, 318-19 (1st Cir. 1987); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 795 F.2d 1516, 1519-21
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 533
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986); United States v. Board of Educ., 794 F.2d
1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1986).
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obtained "unitary status."17 A school system has achieved unitary
7. There is a considerable amount of confusion about the terminology in this area
as well as the effect of a determination of unitary status on an outstanding desegregation
decree. The Supreme Court has neither defined unitary status nor provided definitive
guidance on the issue. See Keyes, 895 F.2d at 665; Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1491 n.15;Jackson-
ville Branch, NAACP v. Duval County School Bd., 883 F.2d 945, 950 (11th Cir. 1989);
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 609 F. Supp. 1491, 1516 (D. Colo. 1985); Gewirtz, Choice in
the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective ldea 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 792
(1986). The Court has, however, addressed the question of what constitutes a "unitary
school system," as opposed to when a school system has obtained unitary status. A
unitary school system is a school system that is not operating as a "dual school system."
In contrast to unitary status, a unitary school system, though desegregated, may not yet
have eliminated the vestiges of its prior discrimination. See Pate v. Dade County School
Bd., 588 F.2d 501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835 (1979) (holding that a district
court retains subject matter jurisdiction over a unitary school system to assure the main-
tenance of a unitary system); Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 448 F.2d 770
(5th Cir. 1971) (ordering that when a school system is declared unitary the district court
must retain jurisdiction over the case for at least three additional school years). Seegener-
ally Chandler, The End of School Busing? School Desegregation and the Finding of Unitary Status,
40 OKLA. L. REV. 519, 538-41 (1987) (discussing the effects of a finding of unitary status
on the court's role in eliminating other vestiges of past discrimination).
Once unitary status is achieved, lower federal courts have generally terminated active
supervision of the school district, dissolved outstanding desegregation decrees, and re-
turned plenary control over the school district and its educational policies to the respon-
sible school officials. See, e.g., Jacksonville Branch, NAACP, 883 F.2d at 950; Quarles, 868
F.2d 750; Overton, 834 F.2d at 1175; Riddick, 784 F.2d at 543.
At least five circuits have held that federal jurisdiction over a school district terminates
once the district obtains unitary status. Jacksonville Branch, NAACP, 883 F.2d at 950; Over-
ton, 834 F.2d at 1174-1177; Morgan, 831 F.2d at 318; Riddick, 784 F.2d at 534-39;
Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985); Spangler v. Pasadena City
Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1979). This leaves unitary school districts
free to choose from the myriad of locally accepted methods for assigning students to
various schools, including neighborhood school assignments, despite the fact that these
methods invariably increase racial concentration in schools.
Professor Landsberg has argued that after a declaration of unitary status, a school
district's adoption of a "retrogression plan" which is a student assignment plan that will
increase the amount of segregation in the school district should be analyzed by a stan-
dard other than the traditional discriminatory intent standard adopted by the Supreme
Court in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). Landsberg, The Desegre-
gated School System and the Retrogression Plan, 48 LA. L. REv. 789, 816-34 (1988). Professor
Landsberg avoids the fact that the adoption of student assignment policies differing
from those embodied in the desegregation decree may substantially increase racial seg-
regation of the students within the school district and at the same time not be classified
as a new violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
In Dowel, however, the Tenth Circuit concluded that even though unitary status was
obtained, the outstanding desegregation decree was not automatically dissolved.
890 F.2d at 1492. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Dowell to address,
among other issues, the impact of a determination of unitary status on an outstanding
desegregation decree.
This Article does not attempt to enter the debate regarding the impact of a determina-
tion of unitary status on an outstanding desegregation decree; rather, it focuses on the
harm caused by de jure segregation. For the purposes of the Article, then, a school
district is considered to have obtained unitary status when federal court supervision
ends and the outstanding desegregation decree is dissolved. At that point, full control
over the school district is returned to the relevant educational authorities. Thus, the
most recent opinion by the Tenth Circuit in Dowell does not amount to a finding of
unitary status for the purposes of this Article.
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status when a federal court determines that it is not only desegre-
gated but also has eliminated the vestiges of its prior racial discrimi-
nation.8 Unitary status is not so much a moment in time as it is a
general state of being.9 Unitary status is a conclusion based upon
relevant considerations.
There is disagreement, however, as to what considerations are
relevant. Many lower federal courts have concluded that the only
relevant factors to consider in determining whether a school district
has obtained unitary status are those that relate primarily to the
amount of desegregation that has occurred within the school dis-
trict.' 0 Arguments have been made in a number of cases, however,
that the determination of unitary status should examine additional
factors, such as objective educational achievement criteria' I and the
good faith efforts of school officials. 12
To ascertain what factors a court should consider in determining
whether unitary status exists, it is necessary to identify a theory ex-
plicating the harm resulting from dejure segregation that remedies
are supposed to eliminate. To date, the Supreme Court has not de-
fined the meaning of unitary status,' 3 the time and method of termi-
nating an outstanding school desegregation decree, 14 or the impact
of unitary status on an existing desegregation decree.' 5 The Court,
however, has granted certiorari in a Tenth Circuit case, Dowell v.
Oklahoma Board of Education, 16 in which it may have an opportunity to
address issues related to unitary status, including what factors a
court should consider when determining unitary status. 17
8. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1413 n.12 (11th Cir. 1985); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 681 F. Supp. 730, 736-
37 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
9. See, e.g., Dowel, 890 F.2d at 1491-92; Morgan, 831 F.2d at 320-21.
10. Quarks, 868 F.2d 750; Overton, 834 F.2d 1175; Riddick, 784 F.2d 521; United
States v. Board of Educ., 794 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1986). To determine the amount of
desegregation a school system has achieved many lower federal courts have applied the
six factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S.
430 (1968). In Green the Court noted that "racial identification of the system's schools
was complete, extending not just to the composition of student bodies at the two
schools but to every facet of school operation-faculty, staff, transportation, extracurric-
ular activities and facilities." Id at 435.
In addition to the Green factors, many lower federal courts consider whether school
authorities have made "every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation." Davis v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971); see, e.g., Brown, 892 F.2d at 859; Dowell, 890
F.2d at 1499; Morgan, 831 F.2d at 319; Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d
218, 227 (5th Cir. 1983).
11. See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
12. SeeJacksonville Branch, NAACP v. Duval County School Bd., 883 F.2d 945, 952
(11th Cir. 1989); Morgan, 831 F.2d at 319; Brown, 892 F.2d at 865; Dowell, 890 F.2d at
1499; Ross, 699 F.2d at 227.
13. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 665 (10th Cir. 1990).
14. See Gewirtz, supra note 7, at 792.
15. See Jacksonville Branch, NAACP, 883 F.2d at 950.
16. 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1521 (1990).
17. Given the current procedural context of Dowell the Supreme Court is not being
asked to determine the relevant factors that a lower court should consider when address-
ing the issue of unitary status. The Oklahoma City school desegregation case com-
menced with the filing of a complaint in 1961. In the ensuing years, the parties
struggled through the difficult task of formulating a desegregation plan. After a plan
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One of the intractable problems of the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence in the area of de jure segregation has been its inability to
articulate a coherent theory of the constitutional harm resulting
from de jure segregation of public schools that justifies desegrega-
tion as the principal means to eliminate the harm. School desegre-
gation has been the principal means employed to remedy the harm
resulting from the constitutional violation of de jure segregation.
Desegregation, however, is no doubt a remedy thought to address
concerns other than merely the racial composition of public
schools.18 With the Supreme Court agreeing to hear Dowell, it is
was implemented, the school board moved inJune 1975 to dose the case on the ground
that it had eliminated all vestiges of state imposed racial discrimination in its school
system and that it was operating a unitary school system. Although the motion was con-
tested, the district court in 1977 terminated active supervision of the case because it
found the desegregation plan had achieved this objective. Dowell v. School Bd., No.
CIV-9452, slip op. (W.D. Okla.Jan. 18, 1977); see Dowell v. Board of Educ., 660 F. Supp.
1548, 1551 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (quoting the unpublished order in part). This order was
not appealed.
In February 1985, the plaintiffs sought to reopen the case claiming that the school
board abandoned the desegregation plan that had been approved by the district court in
1972. The district court concluded, and the Tenth Circuit upheld the decision, that as a
matter of law, the principles ofres judicata and collateral estoppel prohibited the plain-
tiffs from challenging the district court's findings that the school system was unitary. See
Dowel4 795 F.2d at 1518.
Consequently, the issues in front of the Supreme Court center around the fact that the
school system already has obtained unitary status. The questions posed to the Supreme
Court are as follows:
(1) Should compulsory desegregation decree remain operative after for-
merly de jure school system achieves unitary status? (2) Does traditional
standard for dissolution of injunctive decrees involving private parties, as
enunciated in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932), govern disso-
lution of school desegregation decrees? (3) What affirmative desegregation
obligations, if any, does formerly de jure school system have following its
elimination of official discrimination and achievement of unitary status?
(4) Subsequent to achievement of unitary status, is school board's action to
adopt elementary neighborhood school plan that curtails compulsory busing
scrutinized by boardl's lack of discriminatory intent, or by plan's racially dis-
proportionate effect? (5) What are proper criteria for determining whether
unitary status has been maintained? (6) Did court of appeals afford sufficient
deference to factual findings of district court in compliance with Anderson v.
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)?
58 U.S.L.W. 3610 (1990). The Court must confront the impact of the determination of
unitary status upon the outstanding school desegregation plan and decide with what
standards a student assignment plan that deviates from the one outline in the court
decree should be evaluated to determine its constitutionality. Id
TheJustice Department however has recently filed a motion with the Supreme Court
requesting that the Court remand the case to the Tenth Circuit. TheJustice Department
wants the lower courts to conduct further proceedings on the question of whether or not
the district is legally desegregated. See Volume IX, No. 39 EDUC. WEEK 1 (June 20,
1990). Such an inequity would focus specifically on the factors which a school system
must consider in determining unitary status.
18. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 895 F.2d 659, 666 (10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth
Circuit stated that "[in so defining 'unitariness,' we recognize that racial balance in the
schools is no more the goal to be attained than is racial imbalance the evil to be reme-
died." One could, however, take the position advanced by the Tenth Circuit in Dowell
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imperative that the Court articulate a theory to explain the harm
that results from de jure segregation. Such a theory would shed
light on whether considerations other than those related only to de-
segregation should be taken into account by federal courts in deter-
mining whether unitary status has been obtained.
Part I of this Article proposes a new theory to evaluate the harm
to which remedies for dejure segregation should be directed. Pub-
lic schools are cultural institutions whose primary purpose is to in-
still values, including moral, political and social ideas, attitudes,
opinions, and beliefs. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence with re-
spect to education has long focused on this value inculcating func-
tion of education. 19 This Article argues that in order to determine
the harm produced by de jure segregation, it is necessary to view
public schools from that perspective of their value inculcating func-
tion. From that perspective, the harm resulting from dejure segre-
gation should be viewed as the inculcation of the invidious value, of
a value that offends the Constitution. Public schools that engaged
in de jure segregation were inculcating an invidious value belief in
the inherent inferiority of African-Americans.
The segregation of students, teachers, staff, and administrators
along racial lines was an administrative rule that was a primary com-
ponent of an educational program designed to inculcate the invidi-
ous value. Remedies for de jure segregation, therefore, should be
directed towards eliminating invidious value inculcation. Although
desegregation has been the principal means employed to accom-
plish this goal, it should not be viewed as an end in itself.20 Elimi-
nating invidious value inculcation is the remedy for the harm.
In the absence of an articulated theory by the Supreme Court ex-
plicating the purpose of remedies for dejure segregation, a number
of theories have been developed to explain the harm produced by
de jure segregation. Part II of this Article discusses some of these
other theories offered to explicate the constitutional harm produced
by de jure segregation of public schools. These theories fall into
roughly three overlapping categories. The first category of theories
that desegregation as a means to remedy the harm from dejure segregation is not neces-
sarily tied to the constitutional violation. Dowell, at 1491. This argument appears to
contradict the Supreme Court cases that have stressed that the purpose of relief from de
jure segregation is the elimination of all traces of an unconstitutional dual school system
arising from state-imposed segregation. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424, 434 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). The Court has also stated
that "like other equitable remedies, the nature of the desegregation remedy is to be
determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation." Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977).
19. See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
20. This theory loosely fits the Supreme Court's major school desegregation cases.
See infra notes 110-202 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
adopted a narrow view of when public schools were inculcating the invidious value rem-
edy, and the ability of the federal courts to remedy this constitutional violation. Exten-
sive criticism of these limitations, as well as extensive exposition of the nature of
invidious value inculcation in public schools, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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views the harm resulting from dejure segregation in terms of identi-
fiable harms to African-American school children. The second cate-
gory of theories views the harm resulting from de jure segregation
as the embodiment of a failure to the political process. The third
category of theories views the harm resulting from dejure segrega-
tion as an interpretative harm resulting from the meaning attached
to segregation by society.
Part III of this Article will contrast the invidious value inculcation
theory discussed in Part I with other theories addressing the harm
resulting from de jure segregation in public schools. Public educa-
tion is the only government service organized primarily for the pur-
pose of transmitting societal values to children. None of the other
theories addresses the unique role of the value-inculcating function
of public education when that function is contrasted with other ser-
vices provided by the state. The failure to ground these theories in
the value-inculcative aspect of public education is a significant
shortcoming.
It is clear that factors related to desegregation, such as racial com-
position of the student body, faculty, and staff, transportation, extra-
curricular activities, and facilities, should be considered in
determining whether or not a school system has achieved unitary
status.21 What is not clear, however, is whether an examination of
these factors alone should be used to determine the elimination of
invidious value inculcation. Part IV of this Article proposes, tenta-
tively, factors in addition to those related to desegregation which a
court should consider in deliberating on the unitary status of a par-
ticular school district.
21. These are known as the Green factors after the Supreme Court's opinion in
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the most frequently cited Supreme
Court opinion pertaining to the issue of unitary status. See supra note 10. In Green, the
Supreme Court struck down a freedom-of-choice plan adopted by the New Kent County
School Board on the ground that it failed to produce sighificant desegregation. In strik-
ing down the plan, the Court noted that Brown II, the implementation portion of Brown I,
was
a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual systems tempered by an
awareness that complex and multifaceted problems would arise which would
require time and flexibility for a successful resolution. School Boards such
as the respondent... were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.
Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
Although the Court did not specify what it meant by eliminating racial discrimination
"root and branch," at least one noted scholar has interpreted the reference to stand for
elimination of all-white and all-black schools. See Days, School Desegregation Law in the
1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing? (Book Review) 95 YALE L.J. 1737, 1746 (1986).
The Court also observed that lower federal courts do not merely have the power, but
rather the obligation, to render a decree that will eliminate the effects of past discrimina-
tion as well as bar like discrimination in the future. Green, 391 U.S. at 438 n.4 (citing
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
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I. The Theory of Invidious Value Inculcation
Theories explaining the harm resulting from de jure segregation
that remedies are meant to eliminate must accept a certain amount
of generality. This Part first addresses why theories about remedies
for dejure segregation will not yield particularized or determinative
results in the context of a given school district. Next, this Part notes
that public schools perform a number of important functions for
American society, including inculcating dominant American cultural
values and teaching dominant American heritage. This part dis-
cusses the reasons why the Supreme Court should view public
schools in light of this value inculcating function. After discussing
these reasons, this Part focuses on the nature of the harm caused by
de jure segregation from the perspective of public schools as value
inculcating institutions. Viewed in that fashion, the harm resulting
from de jure segregation is invidious value inculcation the remedy
for which is its elimination. As segregation was the principal means
to inculcate the invidious value, desegregation is the principal
means to eliminate invidious value inculcation. Finally, this Part
shows how the theory of invidious value inculcation fits, albeit
loosely, within the general framework of the Supreme Court's de
jure segregation jurisprudence.
A. Theories Explaining the Harm Resulting From Dejure Segregation in
General
The Supreme Court has approved a number of different remedies
for de jure segregation, including remedial reading,22 in-service
teacher training, testing programs, and counseling and career gui-
dance programs.23 School desegregation, however, has been the
principal method used to eliminate the harm resulting from dejure
segregation. A number of methods have been employed to accom-
plish desegregation, including the use of magnet schools, redrawing
district boundaries, consolidations of school systems, and busing.2 4
No doubt school desegregation was thought to remedy harms other
than those caused by the racial composition of public schools. 2 5
The Court did not pursue desegregation for its own sake but be-
cause desegregation was a means directed at eliminating a harm, the
most tangible manifestation of which was racially segregated
schools. A coherent theory explaining the harm attributable to de
jure segregation is necessary to illuminate the purpose behind the
remedies for de jure segregation.
Theories explaining the harm resulting from de jure segregation
that the remedies are meant to eliminate, however, must accept a
certain amount of generality. Whatever the underlying theory, it
22. Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1414 (11 th Cir. 1985).
23. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 275-76.
24. Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 47 (1982).
25. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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will not yield particularized or determinative results. 26
Traditional court-ordered remedies for many other constitutional
violations are generally an outgrowth of the classic litigation model
where judges are called upon to resolve private disputes between
private individuals. 27 In the classic litigation model, where the rem-
edy is generally backward-looking, 28 courts seek to compensate vic-
tims for the injuries they have suffered. The litigation model
provides for determinative results because it is compensatory. 29 In
contrast to the classic litigation model, court ordered remedies for
dejure segregation of public schools must assess the cumulative ef-
fects of discriminatory actions by school districts occurring over a
considerable period of time.3 0 Lawsuits involving de jure segrega-
tion are perhaps the best examples of what Professor Chayes has
named public law litigation.3 ' As Professor Chayes has demon-
strated, the courts, when addressing public law litigation, are asked
to address issues of public policy embedded in constitutional provi-
sions.3 2 The remedy of school desegregation is being provided to
African-American school children today for a constitutional viola-
tion that occurred in the past. As a result, the remedy for de jure
segregation looks to the future rather than the past; it is corrective,
not compensatory. The nature of the violation as well as the remedy
for dejure segregation, therefore, makes the formulation of a theory
that will yield particularized or determinative results difficult.
B. Reasons for Looking at Brown I and Its Progeny from the Perspective
of the Value Inculcating Function of Public Schools
Public schools perform three overlapping functions for American
society. First, schools perform an academic function. Schools dis-
seminate useful information, teach the basic academic and technical
skills that are believed to be necessary for a child to become a self-
sufficient and self-reliant adult, and assist in the cognitive develop-
ment of children.3 3 Second, schools perform a sorting function.3 4
Schools act as classifiers of students based upon judgments about
the student's presumed academic abilities and potentials.35 Third,
26. Chayes, supra note 24, at 49.
27. Id at 4-5.
28. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HAiv. L. REv. 1281, 1282
(1976).
29. Chayes, supra note 24, at 5.
30. Gewirtz, supra note 7, at 784.
31. Id
32. Id. Chayes, supra note 28, at 1284.
33. Note, Education and the Courts: The Supreme Court's Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 939, 942 (1987).
34. See infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
35. The academic judgments made by public schools have immediate implications
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schools perform a value-inculcating function. Public schools are so-
cial institutions that acculturate America's youth. Schools inculcate
dominant American cultural values and teach dominant American
cultural heritage by the selection and exclusion of materials
presented to students in the classroom.3 6 Values are also inculcated
through a myriad of rules and regulations governing student and
teacher conduct.37 For example, rules prohibiting fighting on
school premises attempt to inculcate a belief that violence is not a
proper means to resolve a dispute; rules requiring all students to
attend the same classes and to start school at the same time attempt
to produce favorable attitudes toward dependability and punctual-
ity; and rules requiring students to commence their academic day
by reciting the pledge of allegiance to the flag attempt to produce
patriotic beliefs.38 The segregation of public school students, teach-
ers, and staff was the product of administrative school rules that also
inculcated values, specifically, the inferiority of African-
Americans.3 9
Although American public schools perform three overlapping
functions-academic, sorting, and value inculcation-the value in-
culcating function is most appropriate to judicial decisionmaking.
Both the academic and sorting functions of public schools rely upon
the expert judgment of those specifically trained to instruct
for students in terms of rewards or punishments and in determining what kind of in-
struction the students will receive. See, e.g., J. OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How SCHOOLS
STRUCrURE INEqUALIrY 75, 90, 189 (1985). These sorting judgments also have long-
term implications for students. Academic judgments of public schools are a major de-
terminant of the recipients of future positions of social advantage and, conversely, a
major justification for confining adults to positions of social disadvantage. Sorting deci-
sions made by public schools are therefore paramount in determining the future life-
chances of most students who receive public education. Id at 149, 189.
Professor Tussman noted that the power of the state to make academic judgments in
terms of the consequences of one's life "make[s] pale indeed the transient chidings of
the judicial power." J. TuSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 59 (1977). According to
Tussman:
[The consequences of the exercise of [the sorting function] are drastic ....
Tracking and guiding into roles may have decisive and permanent effects.
The certification of competence or fitness for higher educational opportuni-
ties is the modem substitute for the accident of birth as the determiner of
the quality of life.
It is, I believe, no exaggeration to say that the consequences of the exer-
cise of the [sorting function] outweigh the sanctions of the judicial power.
Id. at 165.
36. Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U.L. REV.
603, 684 (1987); see M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 296-306 (1983).
37. Mitchell, supra note 36, at 684.
38. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
39. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 195-98 (1973), the Supreme
Court noted that, in the Southwest, Hispanics and African-Americans have a great many
things in common, including economic and cultural deprivation and discrimination.
Due to the historic focus on African-Americans in public school desegregation, the dis-
cussions of invidious value inculcation and its implications contained herein are directed
toward African-Americans. To the extent that Hispanics and other minorities have had
similar experiences as African-Americans, however, the same explanation could apply to
them as well.
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America's youth. 40 The Supreme Court has asserted its unwilling-
ness to become the school board of the nation because it lacks the
competence to function in that capacity.4 1 Although the Court may
lack the competence to review public schools' academic and sorting
functions, that does not mean that the Court lacks the competence
to determine what values should be inculcated in public schools.
There is a difference between specifying what values should be
taught and determining what is the best method to teach those val-
ues. The latter requires expertise in educational methodology; the
former does not.
There are also additional reasons why the Supreme Court should
view dejure segregation from the perspective of the value inculcat-
ing function of public education. First, while the Supreme Court
was familiar with the value inculcating function of public schools
prior to Brown I, its more recent cases involving public education
have repeatedly recognized the importance of the value inculcating
function of public education. Many of these recent cases have noted
that the objective of public education is the inculcation of funda-
mental values. Second, public education involves the state's role in
the maturation of children. Through education in public schools,
the government participates in the formulation of consciousness of
the next generation of adults. And finally, public schools are in
many ways an indoctrinator's dream. They are designed to maxi-
mize the likelihood that students internalize the desired values. For
these reasons, judicial scrutiny over the value inculcation process is
imperative.
1. Supreme Court Cases Recognizing the Value Inculating Function of
Public Schools
At the time the Supreme Court decided Brown I, it had not ad-
dressed issues in public schools frequently enough to have devel-
oped a consistent view of public education. Nevertheless, the Court
was no stranger to the value inculcating function of education. In
two of the Court's earliest opinions addressing education, Meyer v.
40. The Court noted in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978),
that academic evaluations of students are by their nature subjective and require expert
evaluation of cumulative information. This is a task not readily adaptable to judicial
decisionmaking.
41. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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Nebraska42 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,48 the Court recognized the
value inculcating function of education. Although both Meyers and
Pierce involved government regulation of private education, prior to
the 1954 decision in Brown 1, the Supreme Court had specifically
examined value inculcation in the context of public education on
two different occasions.
In Minersville School District v. Gobitis,-A the Supreme Court ex-
pressed little apprehension in asserting that public schools should
engage in value inculcation, even if the values being inculcated were
contrary to those of the students' parents. In Gobitis, the Court up-
held a requirement that children ofJehovah's Witnesses participate
in the flag salute, even if such a requirement violated their religious
convictions. 45 The Court, however, reversed the holding in Gobitis
three years later in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.46
Notwithstanding the reversal of Gobitis, the Court in Barnette reaf-
firmed the importance of the value inculcating function of public
schools by vigorously upholding the authority of public schools to
foster national unity.47
2. Brown I and Value Inculcation
It is not surprising that ChiefJustice Warren's opinion in Brown I
also alluded to the value inculcating aspect of public education. In
one of the most often quoted passages in Brown 1, the Court stated
that, "education is perhaps the most important function of state and
42. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In Meyer, the Court reversed the conviction of a school
teacher for teaching the German language in violation of a 1919 Nebraska statute. The
statute prohibited teaching any language other than English to students before they
have completed the eighth grade. The Court noted that "the purpose of the legislation
was to promote civil development by inhibiting training and education of the immature
in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American
ideals." Id. at 401. It was believed that the training of young children in foreign lan-
guages would "inculcate in them the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of
th[e] country." Id. at 398. In holding the statute violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Justice McReynolds indicated that although the statute's goals might be highly
desirable, "a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means." Id. at 401. In
short, the means employed by the Nebraska statute impinged upon a protected liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
43. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, the Court invalidated an Oregon citizen's initia-
tive that required "every parent, guardian or other person having control or charge or
custody of a child between [the ages of] eight and sixteen years" to send the child to a
public school. Id. at 530. The substantive effect of the initiative would have been to
eliminate private schools. For an explanation of the historical events surrounding the
initiative, see G. TYACK, S.JAMES & F. BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION, 1785-1954, at 177-92 (1987). Although upholding the right of private schools to
operate, the Court noted that no question was being raised concerning the power of the
state to reasonably regulate all schools, public and private, to provide that certain stud-
ies plainly essential to good citizenship be taught and that nothing be taught that is
manifestly inimical to the public welfare. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
44. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
45. Id. at 599.
46. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
47. Id. at 640. The Court agreed that national unity was an end that officials may
foster, but simply objected to compelling the fostering of national unity with the flag
salute. Id.
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local governments" and that "[i]t is a principal instrument in awak-
ening the child to cultural values."'48 The Court in Brown I, there-
fore, also recognized the value inculcating function of public
schools.
3. Supreme Court Cases Recognizing the Value Inculcating Function of
Public Schools
Examining de jure segregation from the perspective of the value
inculcating function of public education seems to be particularly ap-
propriate in light of the recent Supreme Court cases addressing
First Amendment issues in public education. 49  Although the
Supreme Court has always noted the importance of the value incul-
cating aspect of public education, its more recent First Amendment
cases have been extremely forthright about embracing this aspect as
the primary function of public education.50
In Board of Education v. Pico,51 the Court addressed the removal of
controversial books from a public school library by school officials.
Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of the Court, held that stu-
dents possess a right to receive information and that right is violated
whenever school officials remove books from school libraries in or-
der to deny students access to ideas with which the officials disa-
gree.52 In so holding, Justice Brennan stated that "[the Court has]
acknowledged that public schools are vitally important... vehicles
for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of
a democratic political system.' ,,3 Likewise, Justice Blackmun, in his
concurring opinion, stated that "the Court has acknowledged the
importance of the public schools.. . 'in the preservation of the val-
ues on which our society rests' . . . Because of the essential social-
izing function of schools, local education officials . . . 'awake[n] the
48. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
49. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding the
authority of public school officials to censor a student newspaper); Bethel School Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding the authority of public school officials to disci-
pline a student for the content of a vulgar speech delivered at a student assembly);
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (limiting school board's discretion to re-
move books from the school libraries); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979)
(upholding against an Equal Protection Clause challenge a New York statute forbidding
permanent certification as a public school teacher of any person who is not a United
States citizen).
50. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 278; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681; Pico, 457 U.S. at 864;
Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77-78.
51. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
52. I& at 871. Justices Marshall and Stevens joined the opinion written by Justice
Brennan. Id. at 855. The Court remanded the case to the district court and instructed it
to determine the motive of the school officials in ordering the removal of the books. Id.
at 873-75.
53. Id at 864 (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-77).
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child to cultural values.' 54 Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting
opinion, also placed emphasis on the value inculcating function of
public schools. CriticizingJustice Brennan's plurality opinion for its
inconsistency, Justice Rehnquist stated that
the idea that students have a right to access, in the school, to infor-
mation other than that thought by their educators to be necessary
is contrary to the very nature of an inculcative education.
Thus, Justice Brennan cannot rely upon the nature of school
libraries to escape the fact that the First Amendment right to receive
information simply has no application to the one public institution which, by
its very nature, is a place for the selective conveyance of ideas.55
In Bethel School District v. Fraser, 5 6 the Court found itself addressing
the situation of a student who had been disciplined for delivering a
speech at a student assembly that made suggestive use of vulgar and
offensive terms. Notwithstanding the change in circumstances from
library book removal to student speech at a student assembly, the
Court reaffirmed its belief in the value inculcating function of public
schools. Citing its opinion in Ambach v. Norwick,57 the Court stated:
The role and purpose of the American public school system
were well described by two historians, who stated: "[P]ublic edu-
cation must prepare students for citizenship .... It must incul-
cate the habits and manners of civility as values in themselves
conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of
self-government in the community and the nation." In Ambach v.
Norwick, we echoed the essence of this statement of the objectives of public
education as the "inculcat[ion ofIfundamental values necessary to the main-
tenance of a democratic political system.' 58
In Hazlewood School District v. Kuhlmeier 59 the Court addressed con-
tent-based censorship by a school principal of articles that were to
appear in a student newspaper. 60 In upholding the principal's deci-
sion to censor the articles, Justice White, writing for the majority,
repeatedly noted the importance of value inculcation by public
54. Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
55. Id at 914-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. Id. at 904.
56. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
57. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
58. 478 U.S. at 681 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting C. BEARD & M.
BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
59. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
60. Id at 262-64. Principal Reynolds of Hazelwood East High School objected to
two student-written articles. One was an article describing three Hazelwood East stu-
dents' experiences with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on stu-
dents at the school. Even though the pregnancy story used false names to keep the girls'
identities a secret, Reynolds was concerned that the students could still be identified
from the text. Reynolds also believed that the article's references to sexual activity and
birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school.
Reynolds' concern about the article on divorce related to the fact that one of the stu-
dents identified by name made defamatory comments about her father. Reynolds felt
that the student's parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to her
remarks or to consent to publication. Id.
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schools.6 1 Further, in his dissent, Justice Brennan noted that public
schools "inculcate[] in tomorrow's leaders the 'fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system...'
All the while, the public educator nurtures students' social and
moral development by transmitting to them an official dogma of
'community values.' ",62
Although Pico, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier all addressed First Amend-
ment issues arising in the context of public schools, the Court has
also paid particular attention to the value inculcating function of
public schools in cases addressing issues involving the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in public schools. In fact, the Supreme Court's first ar-
ticulation of the language regarding the role of education as
inculcating fundamental values necessary for the maintenance of a
democratic political system comes from an equal protection case,
Ambach v. Norwich.63
Ambach involved an equal protection challenge to a New York law
that forbade certification of any person as a public school teacher
who was not a citizen of the United States unless that person mani-
fested an intention to apply for citizenship.6 4 The appellees were
two foreign-born individuals who were otherwise qualified to teach
in public schools.65 They challenged the law on the grounds that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause by employing a classification
based on alienage. 66 In upholding the New York law, the Court
stated that although classifications based on alienage are normally
inherently suspect, there are exceptions.6 7 According to the Court
"some state functions are so bound up with the operation of the
State as a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those
functions of all persons who have not become part of the process of
self-government."' 68 Such functions, therefore, will not be reviewed
under the rigorous constitutional test normally applied to suspect
classifications. If the classification based on alienage relates to one
of those government functions, then it is reviewed under the less
stringent rational basis test.69
61. Kuhmeier, 484 U.S. at 271, 274, 278.
62. Id. at 278. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)).
63. 441 U.S. 68, 78 (1979).
64. Id. at 69-70.
65. Appellee Norwick was born in Scotland and was a citizen of Great Britain. She
had been a resident of the United States since 1965 and was married to an American
citizen. Appellee Dachinger was a Finnish citizen who came to the United States in
1966. She was also married to an American citizen. Neither of the Appellees wanted to
give up their citizenship in their native countries. Id
66. Id. at 71.
67. Id. at 74-75.
68. Id. at 73-74.
69. Id. at 74. The Court noted that the distinction between citizens and aliens is
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity. However, the status of citizenship, whether by
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In determining whether or not teaching in public schools consti-
tutes a government function, the Court stated that "we look to the
role of public education and to the degree of responsibility and dis-
cretion teachers possess in fulfilling that role." 70 According to the
Court, "[p]ublic education, like the police function, 'fulfills a most
fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.' The im-
portance of public schools in the ... preservation of the values on
which our society rests, long has been recognized by our deci-
sions." 71 After finding the value inculcating function of public
schools fundamental, the Court upheld the New York law under ra-
tional basis review.72
4. Value Inculcation of Children Is Inevitable
Apart from Supreme Court case law recognizing the value incul-
cating function of public schools, there is another reason to examine
dejure segregation from the value inculcating perspective: the cog-
nitive development of children makes value inculcation inevitable.
Although there are exceptions, children generally lack the experi-
ence, maturity, and judgment of adults, and, as a result, cannot criti-
cally evaluate what is being presented to them.7 3 Children must go
through a maturation process during which they will have exper-
iences and develop a perspective that will indelibly affect how they
view themselves, others, their country, and the world.74 Thus, with
respect to children, the question is not whether or not they will go
through a maturation process in which they will obtain values, but
birth or by naturalization, denotes an association with the polity. The lack of this associ-
ation provides government entities with wider latitude in limiting participation of nonci-
tizens. Id. at 75.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 76 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978)).
72. Id. at 80-81. The Court also noted the importance of the value inculcating func-
tion of public schools in another case addressing the application of the Equal Protection
Clause in public schools, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131
(1982). Plyler, however, was not decided primarily with reference to the value inculcat-
ing function of public schools.
73. The Supreme Court has recognized "three reasons justifying the conclusion that
the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing." Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
74. Some commentators have challenged the notion that schools have an enduring
effect on the attitudes, values, and even intellectual development. See R. CoLuINs, THE
CREDENTIAL SOCIETY 1-21 (2d ed. 1985); C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF
THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA, 135 (1972). Collins stresses that
what is learned in school is rapidly forgotten and makes little contribution to the effec-
tiveness of adult role job performance. The importance of schooling for Collins lies in
the general acceptance of the principle that educational credentials are a fair and ra-
tional method of allocating occupational positions in American society. R. COLLINS,
supra, at 20-21.
This line of research presents a particular challenge to the discourse regarding the
inculcation of fundamental values. If the school's inculcation is ineffective, then argua-
bly the exposure to ideas that a child or a parent finds abhorrent should not be objected
to, because the effect on the child as an adult will be negligible. This conclusion, how-
ever, conflicts with the exercise of the state's police power, or parens patriae, to compel
attendance at school which is obviously based on an assumption that the school experi-
ence does have an impact on how the child will view the world.
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rather, who will be involved in that process and how will it be struc-
tured.75 No matter how misguided children are, in the near future
they will become members of the adult community. Once they are
adults they will be entitled to act on their own values, regardless of
how they have come by them.
The influence of public education in the maturation process of
America's youth cannot be overstated. Public schools enroll ap-
proximately 90% of all eligible school-age children. 76 As Professor
Yudof remarked, in our society children are perceived in the Kant-
ian sense "as both ends in themselves, evolving autonomous beings,
and as instruments of larger societal purposes. ' 77 Through public
education government participates directly in the formulation of the
consciousness of the next generation of adult citizens.78 The estab-
lishment of public schools with concomitant compulsory attendance
statutes79 reflects in part the exercise by the state of its police power
to assure the public health, safety, welfare, and morality.8 0 Underly-
ing the legitimacy of the establishment of public schools is the ac-
mowledgment that, with respect to children, government power is
not limited to physical coercion and persuasion. As opposed to the
adult mind, the fertile mind of a child is a legitimate subject of pub-
lic concern.8'
75. Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy". Value Training in the
Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 15, 15-20.
76. In 1987 it was estimated that of all the students enrolled in elementary and sec-
ondary schools in 1985, 39.8 million of these students, or 89%5, were enrolled in public
schools. DEPARTMENT Or EDUCATION STUDY, supra note 5, at 58.
77. Yudof, Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean
Point, 59 IND. LJ. 527 (1984).
78. M. APPLE, IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM 32-33 (1979).
79. Virtually every state plus the District of Columbia has adopted a compulsory
school attendance statute. 2 W. VALENTE, EDUCATION LAW: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 455-56
(1985).
80. The state police power has been ubiquitously recognized. E.g., State v. Hoyt,
146 A. 170 (N.H. 1929); State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 750 (Ind. 1901); see also Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926);Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
24-25 (1905).
81. For a discussion of the rationale of allowing the Government access to the mind,
seeJ. TussmAN, supra note 35, at 51-85. Professor Tussman asserts that the public inter-
est in the condition of the mind is the most fundamental part of the public domain. Id.
at I1.
Indeed, as long ago as 1933, Carter Woodson wrote:
When you control a man's thinking you do not have to worry about his ac-
tions. You do not have to tell him not to stand here or go yonder. He will
find his "proper place" and will stay in it. You do not need to send him to
the back door. He will go without being told. In fact, if there is no back
door, he will cut one for his special benefit. His education makes it
necessary.
C. WOODSON, THE MIS-EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO xiii (1933). This is not to say that the
purpose of public schools is to produce automatons reacting obediently to the dictates
of government authority, but rather to reveal the centrality of the involvement of the
government in areas related to the formulation of the consciousness of children.
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5. Courts Must Be Solicitous of the Indoctrination of the Value
Inculcating Function of Public Schools
The final reason for looking at Brown I and its progeny from the
value inculcating function of public schools is that instruction in
public schools is designed to maximize the likelihood that students
internalize desired messages. The use of exhortation, physical, and
mental coercion, including physical punishment8 2 and a system of
rewards and punishments that are common in public schools, is
comparable to a system of indoctrination. As Professor Ingber has
reminded us so cogently:
Public schools are, in many ways, an indoctrinator's dream. First,
attendance is compulsory, and students lack the independent
knowledge or psychological sophistication necessary to evaluate
critically what their teachers tell them. Second, public schools can
package their message as highly valued "education" rather than as
less trustworthy propaganda. Third, the adult teacher's authority
and seemingly vast fund of knowledge will likely impress the chil-
dren. Finally, teachers reward and punish students according to
how well they learn the lesson of the day.8 3
The cognitive condition of children and the structure of public
education require courts to be particularly concerned about the
value inculcating function of public schools.8 4 Public schools are re-
sponsible for teaching future generations of adult citizens and
thereby are in the process of molding attitudes that will affect all
Americans in the future. Analyzing Brown I and its school desegre-
gation progeny from the perspective of the value inculcating func-
tion of public education thus may provide additional insight into the
Supreme Court's decisions in this area.
C. The Harm Recognized in Brown Ifom the Perspective of the Value-
Inculcating Function of Public Schools
Brown I provides the only extended discussion by the Supreme
Court of the harm resulting from de jure segregation of public
82. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 691-92 (1977), the Supreme Court held
that use of corporal punishment as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools
did not violate the Eighth Amendment nor was the failure to hold even an informal
hearing prior to the paddling a violation of the students' rights under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recently refused to revisit the issue of
corporal punishment in public schools by declining to hear Cunningham v. Beavers, 858
F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming the district court's holding that plaintiffs who were
paddled by their teachers failed to state a claim of deprivation of substantive due process
or equal protection that would entitle them to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1343 (1989).
83. Ingber, supra note 75, at 21-22 (footnote omitted).
84. Professor Ingber succinctly described the dilemma of public education:
The community demands an effective school program that promotes the
"right" values .... Yet children are highly vulnerable to "village tyrants"
who might pervert the educational process. On one hand, society expects
schools to instill values and thoughts while transmitting knowledge. On the
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schools. Although the Court noted that segregation may produce
an educational harm, the Court focused on the psychological harm
caused by segregation.8 5 As the Court stated, "[t]o separate [Afri-
can-American children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone."8 6 Feelings of inferiority obvi-
ously are the result of a value-the belief in such inferiority. From
the perspective of the value inculcating function of public schools,
the central inquiry is thus whether public schools are engaged in
actions that could inculcate such a value. It is not a question of
whether or not schools are successful at generating feelings of infer-
iority. Rather, the focus is on whether schools are inculcating the
invidious value.
Segregation in public schools was a system founded upon the
classification and separation of students based on race. Yet, there is
nothing inherently wrong with classification and separation of
school children. Schools routinely classify and separate students as
a matter of pedagogy. Fourth grade pupils, for example, are sepa-
rated from sixth grade pupils. Students are also classified and sepa-
rated on the basis of perceived academic ability.8 7 In order to
determine whether or not public schools are engaged in invidious
85. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. Chief Justice Warren quoted a portion of the oral
record of a Kansas court that noted that inferiority affects the motivation of a child to
learn. Id at 493. According to Warren, therefore, the educational harm was derivative
from true psychological harm. This point also was made by the group of social scientists
working in the area of American race relations. The report was attached as an appendix
to the appellant's briefs fied in Brown I. See The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of
Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, 37 MINN. L. Rxv. 427, 430 (1953) [hereinafter
Social Science Statement]. The Court also noted that it is doubtful that any child may rea-
sonably be expected to succeed in life if denied the opportunity of an education. Brown
1, 347 U.S. at 493.
86. Brown , 347 U.S. at 494.
87. The practice of achievement or ability grouping is not per se unconstitutional.
Under certain circumstances courts have approved this practice. See, e.g., Montgomery v.
Starkville Mun. Separate School Dist., 854 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that
achievement grouping in English and math was permissible even though it resulted in
segregated classrooms); Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that school district's bilingual program did not discriminate against Mexican-Americans
in its ability groups practice); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 996 (5th Cir. Unit A
1981) (noting that ability grouping is not per se unconstitutional but is subject to closer
judicial scrutiny when occurring in a school district with a past history of unlawful dis-
crimination); Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411, 414-15 (5th Cir.) (finding that group-
ing according to academic performance that resulted in Mexican-American students
being grouped together was not unlawful), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975). But see
Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (permanently enjoining the use of
IQ tests which were resulting in the overrepresentation of black students in special
classes), aff'd, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (order granting preliminary injunction to restrain school district from ad-
ministering IQ tests that were resulting in the placement of children in racially unbal-
anced classes), aff'd, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,
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value inculcation, it is necessary to determine why the separation of
black and white school children occurred; that is, the meaning at-
tached to the separation.
The only way to determine the meaning attached to the segrega-
tion of black and white school children is to examine the contempo-
rary and historical context that produced racial separation in public
schools. The historical context of segregation in the South88 was
formulated and perpetuated over the course of the 300 years of in-
teraction between the blacks and whites. As Professor Black noted
some thirty years ago:
Segregation in the South comes down in apostolic succession
from slavery and the Dred Scott case. The South fought to keep
slavery, and lost. Then it tried the Black Codes, and lost. Then it
looked around for something else and found segregation. The
movement for segregation was an integral part of the movement
to maintain and further "white supremacy"....s9
As an organized system, the connotation attached to segregation
was unmistakably clear: African-Americans were inferior to whites.
According to one scholar, ChiefJustice Warren noted as much when
he opened the Supreme Court's conference on Brown I by stating,
that "the Court's precedents sustaining segregation could rest only
on a theory that [African-Americans] were inferior." 90
Segregation was the product of the prevailing and historical belief
in the invidious value.9' Segregation in public schools was merely a
part of a deeply rooted cultural system92 based on and designed to
411-14 (D.D.C. 1967) (finding that ability grouping based on standardized tests disad-
vantaged African-American students and amounted to unlawful discrimination), aff'd sub
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
Tracking, a system which groups secondary school students for instruction by achieve-
ment and ability has also been criticized from an educational and methodological stand-
point. See, e.g., J. OAKEs, supra note 59 (concluding that tracking reflects and perpetuates
racial inequalities in society, leading to unequal educational experiences of minority and
poor children).
88. According to the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Cen-
sus, the "South" today is comprised of the states of the Old Confederacy as well as
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN HISTORICAL VIEW, 1790-1978, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE 254 (1979) [hereinafter HISTORICAL VIEW].
89. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424-25 (1960).
Historian C. Vann Woodward has argued that segregation became necessary only after
the demise of slavery. There was a virtual absence of segregation in the antebellum
South. Segregation would have been inconvenient and an obstruction to the efficient
functioning of the system of slavery. The mere policing of the slaves and the exaction of
involuntary labor required more or less constant scrutiny. C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OFJIM CROW 12 (3d ed. 1974).
90. K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 17 (1989).
91. According to the authors of the Social Science Statement, "historically segregation
patterns in the United States were developed on the assumption of the inferiority of the
segregated." Social Science Statement, supra note 86, at 432-33. As Justice Harlan stated in
his dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896), segregation
"proceed[ed] on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they
cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens."
92. In Brown I, the brief filed by the United States urged the Court "to bear in mind
that school segregation was not an isolated phenomenon, but 'part of a larger social
pattern of racial relationships.'" R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUsTICE 726 (1976).
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perpetuate the invidious value.93 Although the belief in the invidi-
ous value generated the practice of segregation, segregation also re-
inforced the invidious value.94 A cycle was initiated in which
segregation was based on the invidious value and the practice of
segregation perpetuated this value. Racial segregation in public
schools was not, therefore, the transgressor; the transgressor was
invidious value inculcation. Mandatory racial segregation in public
schools was simply the principal means by which to inculcate the
invidious value.
D. Phrasing the Remedy for Dejure Segregation
Initially, the Supreme Court did not mandate racial mixing in or-
der to eliminate the harm resulting from dejure segregation. After
Green, however, it was clear that the Court required racial mixing in
order to prevent public schools from inculcating the invidious value
any longer.95 Mandatory racial mixing in public schools repre-
sented a significant departure from the Court's remedies for segre-
gation of public parks,96 beaches, 97 golf courses, 98 transportation, 99
93. One cannot think about segregation without being reminded of Charles Black's
immortal 1960 article. Black wrote:
Then does segregation offend against equality? Equality, like all general
concepts, has marginal areas where philosophic difficulties are encountered.
But if a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which is set
up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior station,
and if the question is then solemnly propounded whether such a race is be-
ing treated "equally," I think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign pre-
rogatives of philosophers-that of laughter. The only question remaining
(after we get our laughter under control) is whether the segregation system
answers to this description.
Here I must confess to a tendency to start laughing all over again.
Black, supra note 89, at 424.
94. Racial segregation in public schools "creates feelings of inferiority and personal
humiliation in [African-American] youngsters, whose sense of self-esteem is soon re-
placed with self-hatred, rejection of their racial group, and frustration." R. KLUGER,
supra note 92, at 556.
95. The Supreme Court's opinion in Brown I could be read as merely prohibiting
segregation and not requiring racial mixing. Additional support for this proposition can
be found in Section 401 (b) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which specifically states: "'De-
segregation' means the assignment of students to public schools and within such schools
without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin, but 'desegregation'shall not
mean the assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000c(b) (1988) (emphasis added). In Green, however, the Supreme Court officially
declared that segregated public schools have an affirmative duty to integrate their stu-
dent bodies. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968).
96. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per
curiam).
97. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
98. Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
99. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses).
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and other public facilities.100 In those cases, the Court simply con-
cluded that mandatory racial separation was unconstitutional. Nor
could this departure be attributed solely to a distinction between
adults and children. In Bazemore v. Friday x0 the Court also rejected
the notion that mandatory racial mixing of children was necessary to
eliminate the harm resulting from segregated 4-H and Home-
maker's clubs sponsored by the state.
The remedy for segregation of public education differs from the
remedy for segregation of other public facilities or services because
the primary purpose of public education is to inculcate values in
children. 10 2 The rights involved in public schools, therefore, are
those of children in a value inculcating institution. At the time the
Supreme Court expressed its frustration with the lethargic pace of
the desegregation process in Green, desegregation appeared to be
the best means by which public schools could eliminate invidious
value inculcation. 03 In order to eliminate the harm resulting from
de jure segregation in public schools, racial mixing seemed to be
required. 04 Although desegregation was the principal means by
which to effectuate the remedy, 10 5 it was not the remedy itself. The
remedy was for the public schools to cease the inculcation of the
invidious value.
E. The Value Inculcation Theory Within the Framework of the Major
School Desegregation Cases
The Supreme Court did not explicitly endorse invidious value in-
culcation as the harm produced by de jure segregation. This Part
examines the major Supreme Court cases of Green v. County School
Board, ' 06 Keyes v. School District No. 1,107 Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken
I), 108 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 109 and Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken II), 10 as they would be seen if the Court viewed the
constitutional harm derived from de jure segregation as invidious
100. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (courtrooms); Turner v.
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (municipal airports).
101. 478 U.S. 385 (1986). See infra notes 295-312 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
103. The Court first expressed dissatisfaction with the implementation decision of
Brown 11 in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). There, the Court spoke out against the
open and violent resistance that Brown I was encountering in the South: "The Constitu-
tional rights of [the] respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and
disorder which have followed upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature." Id. at
16.
In Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963), the Court invalidated a desegre-
gation plan that allowed students initially assigned on the basis of school zone bounda-
ries to transfer from a school where their race was in the minority to a school where their
race was in the majority. In voiding the plan, the Court characterized it as working only
toward the "perpetuat[ion] of segregation." Id. at 686.
104. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
106. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
107. 413 U.S. 189, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973).
108. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
109. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
110. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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value inculcation. This examination will show that viewing the harm
resulting from dejure segregation as invidious value inculcation fits,
albeit loosely, within the general framework of these cases.
1. Green v. County School Board-Why It Was Necessary to
Eliminate the Racial Characteristic of the Public Schools
In Green, " ' the Supreme Court struck down a freedom-of-choice
plan adopted by the New Kent County School Board on the ground
that it failed to produce significant desegregation. 1 2 The cause of
the initial separation of black and white school children in New Kent
County was based upon the invidious value. The attendance pat-
terns of schools in New Kent County, therefore, reflected the invidi-
ous value, which was being inculcated in the public schools. In
order to terminate invidious value inculcation, the dual school sys-
tem had to be dismantled. 1 3 Desegregation would eliminate the
existence of the all-white and all-African-American schools and
thereby eliminate the principal characteristic being used to inculcate
the invidious value. Until the racial identifiability of the schools was
eliminated and there were "just schools,"' " 4 the principal means by
which to inculcate the invidious value still existed." 5
The freedom-of-choice plan adopted by the school authorities
was not a remedy for the past violations, but rather it was a continu-
ation of the prior practice of invidious value inculcation. The fact
111. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
112. Id at 441. There were only two schools in the entire school district: New Kent
School was on the east side of the county and the George W. Watkins School was on the
west side of the county. Id at 432. Watkins was considered the school for blacks and
New Kent the school for whites. Id. The desegregation plan implemented by the school
board allowed a pupil to choose his or her own public school. Students who did not
choose were reassigned to the school they previously attended. Students seeking enroll-
ment for the first time were assigned at the discretion of the school board. Id During
the three years the desegregation plan was in effect, no white student had enrolled in the
Watkins school and only 15%o of the black students attended New Kent School. Id at
441.
According to the Supreme Court, this plan was not a sufficient step to effectuate a
transition to a unitary system because it "operated simply to burden children and their
parents with a responsibility which (Brown II) placed squarely on the School Board." Id
at 441-42.
113. Subsequent Supreme Court cases also refer to the disestablishment of dual
school systems as an important aspect of the remedial goal. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecldenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1971); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1979).
114. Green, 391 U.S. at 442.
115. The need to eliminate the racial characteristics of the school in order to elimi-
nate the invidious value inculcation would also explain the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972). In Scot-
land Neck, the Court noted that public school officials could not justify continued racial
imbalance in public schools because of the fear of "white flight." Id. at 491. Even
though a desegregation plan might include the seeds of resegregation, the racial charac-
ter of the schools had to be disestablished in order to eliminate the inculcation of the
invidious value.
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that African-American and white parents may have had some choice
in the schools that their children attended did not eliminate invidi-
ous value inculcation. Their choices had been conditioned by estab-
lished patterns of behavior and beliefs that were rooted in the
invidious value. 116 To simply conclude that freedom-of-choice
plans eliminated invidious value inculcation overnight would re-
quire the Court to ignore the social context of the parents' choices.
It would not be possible to explain the continued existence of the
segregated school attendance pattern as a product of autonomous
choices that were independent of the invidious value. 117 Although
the Constitution generally does not recognize the concept of tainted
choice, the nature of public education as a value inculcating institu-
tion for children requires special consideration of the possibility of
tainted choices when determining how tooremedy a constitutional
violation affecting public schools. 118
2. Keyes v. School District No. 1-Intentional Segregation as the
Constitutional Violation and the Keyes "Presumption"
The Supreme Court's opinion in Keyes " 9 is noteworthy for two
reasons.1 20 First, the Court introduced the de jure/de facto segre-
gation distinction.' 21 Second, the Court adopted a procedural rule
that a finding of intentional school segregation in a meaningful part
of a school district created a strong presumption that segregated
schooling throughout the district was similarly motivated. 122
Keyes was the first Supreme Court opinion addressing dejure seg-
regation in a state (Colorado) where, in 1954, the public schools
were not segregated pursuant to state statutory authority. At the
time of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown , segregation of
public schools was mandatory in seventeen states pursuant to state
116. For an excellent discussion of the concept of tainted choices, see GEWIRTZ, supra
note 7, at 741-49.
117. Id. at 749.
118. This explanation of the need to eliminate racial identifiability would also explain
the Supreme Court's treatment of the companion case to Green, Monroe v. Board of
Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450 (1968). In Monroe, the defendant, in order to comply with
Brown II, instituted a geographically based attendance zone student-assignment policy,
but as part of the plan it allowed any student to transfer from his zoned school to a
school of choice. Id. at 453-54. All white students and most black students exercised
their right to transfer to the previously racially identified schools. Id. at 457. That plan,
like the one in Green, thus failed to produce a significant amount of desegregation. Id at
458.
119. 413 U.S. 189, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973).
120. The Court in Keyes also addressed for the first time the issue of how to treat
Hispanics for purposes of de jure segregation of public schools. As discussed above,
because most of the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence was devel-
oped within the context of race relations between blacks and whites, this article focuses
on dejure segregation of public schools within the context of that relationship. See supra
note 62.
121. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 205-06.
122. Id. at 208.
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statute and permissible by statute in four other states. 123 Approxi-
mately 40% of the nation's school children were enrolled in segre-
gated schools in those states. 124  Before Keyes, school districts
segregated pursuant to state statute were automatically charged
with an affirmative duty to effectuate a transfer to a racially nondis-
criminatory school system.125 Racial segregation of public school
children in those states was dearly directed towards invidious value
inculcation. 126
The racial segregation in public schools challenged in Keyes did
not arise in an area of the country that shared the South's history of
racism. The history of race relations outside of the "Old Confeder-
acy" and border states was both qualitatively and quantitatively dif-
ferent than that of the South and border states.' 27 To begin with,
slavery was primarily confined to the South and border states. At
the time of the Civil War, approximately 92% of all blacks lived in
the states that comprised the Old Confederacy and the border
states.'28 For most northern and western states, therefore, there
was very little history of slavery. Even as late as 1940, fourteen
years before Brown I, over three-quarters of African-Americans still
resided in the South and the border states.' 29 For some states, es-
pecially Western states, there was no history of a large population of
African-Americans.
In Keyes, the Court faced the issue of how to determine the consti-
tutional violations in areas of the country where school segregation
did not arise pursuant to state statute. In the South and border
states, school segregation pursuant to state statutory authority made
the school systems that engaged in invidious value inculcation easy
to identify. It was not necessary to make the arduous distinction
between school systems that violated the constitution and school
systems that did not. As a result, the ad hoc decisions that federal
123. D. RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945-1980, at 125(1983).
124. I at 127.
125. See, .e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971);
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
126. .See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence, Segregation "Mis-
understood" The Milliken Decision Revisited 12 U.S.F.L. Pv. 15, 33-40 (1977). Professor
Lawrence argues that segregation was more of a northern doctrine than a southern one
and that government action was as important in establishing segregation in the North as
it was in the South. Id at 22. See generally L. LrrWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961)
(presenting an authoritative account of the treatment of African-Americans north of the
Mason-Dixon Line). Although it may be true that segregation was originally more of a
northern doctrine than a southern one, blacks were subjected to more discriminatory
treatment in the South than the North.
128. HisToaicAL VIEW, supra note 88, at 11.
129. Id. at 13. As late as 1910, 89% of African-Americans still resided in the South.
Id.
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courts made were confined to the remedial stage. By contrast, in
Keyes, the Court was required to formulate a method for lower fed-
eral courts to use in order to identify school systems that violated
the Constitution from those that did not. Individual determinations
of which school systems were engaged in invidious value inculcation
were therefore inevitable. What was in doubt was the formulation
of the method by which to make those determinations.
The Supreme Court in Keyes posited intentional segregation as the
standard.130 The Court emphasized that there was a difference be-
tween de jure and de facto segregation. De jure segregation is a
"current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state
action directed specifically to the [segregated schools]."' ' l If the
plaintiffs could not establish that the segregation was intentional,
then there was no constitutional violation.
From Keyes it is obvious that invidious value inculcation depends
upon the local meaning attached to segregation in public schools. It
is an effects-oriented examination because from the perspective of
the value inculcating function of public schools, the primary effect
of public education is the inculcation of values. 132 The Court in
Keyes directed federal courts to look primarily at the intent of the
local school officials to determine the existence of de jure segrega-
tion.'33 School board decisions, including those related to student,
teacher, administrative, and staff school assignments, embody local
consensus values. Public schools have historically been inculcators
of local community values.' 3 4
The focus on the intent of school officials as the way to assess the
local meaning attached to segregation seems appropriate. By ascer-
taining the intent of school officials, the local community values that
were being inculcated in the public schools were elucidated. The
requirement that plaintiffs prove intent to segregate the students
was tantamount to the plaintiffs proving that the meaning of segre-
gation in the public schools in a given school system operated to
inculcate the invidious value. If the plaintiffs could not establish
that segregation was the result of intent, 3 5 then schools were not
inculcating the invidious value.
The adoption of an intent standard to determine whether or not a
constitutional violation has occurred, however, suffers from a
130. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
131. Id at 205-06.
132. See supra notes 42-72.
133. The Court in Keyes also noted that to determine whether a school was segregated
required more than a focus limited to the racial composition of faculty and staff, but also
required that community and administrative attitudes towards the schools be taken into ac-
count. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 196. The primary focus of determining whether or not dejure
segregation existed, however, was on the intent of school officials.
134. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973).
135. At least one commentator has taken issue with the conclusion that racial preju-
dice was a factor in the Denver School Board's policy decisions. Yudof, Nondiscrimination
and Beyond in School Desegregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
97, 110 (1980).
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number of defects. First, the standard makes the effort of establish-
ing a constitutional violation tedious, expensive, and protracted.
"'Six weeks of trial [producing] more than four thousand pages of
testimony and nearly two thousand exhibits' [is] not uncommon in
the search for constitutional violations."' 136 Even though courts al-
most always find de jure segregation whenever litigation is "seri-
ously pursued,"13 7 the added cost of obtaining and introducing such
evidence is no doubt enough to discourage many potential plaintiffs
from going to court at all.
Second, as recently pointed out by Professor Strauss, the intent
standard as applied generally in antidiscrimination cases is incoher-
ent and indeterminate. 3 8 Its operation in the area of school segre-
gation is no different. Recognizing as much, Justice Powell, in his
separate opinion in Keyes, urged a more uniform approach and pre-
dicted that the results of litigation under the new standard would be
"fortuitous, unpredictable, and even capricious" as courts endeav-
ored "to ascertain the subjective intent of school authorities with
respect to action taken or not taken over many years."' 39
True to Justice Powell's prediction, the adoption of an intent stan-
dard has led to inconsistent results. For example, at the same time a
federal judge in Grand Rapids, Michigan ruled that optional attend-
ance zones, construction of schools in segregated neighborhoods,
and assignments of black teachers to black schools all had permissi-
ble explanations.140 A different federal judge in nearby Kalamazoo,
Michigan held similar practices to be unconstitutional.14 ' On ap-
peal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed both of the lower court decisions. 142
Rather than adopting an intent standard, the Court could have
focused on the existence of de facto segregation as the means for
determining whether invidious value inculcation had occurred. A
de facto segregation standard would not have eliminated the need
for federal courts to make ad hoc determinations based on whether
or not a particular school system was segregated. Such a standard,
however, would reduce the cost of the determination of whether
136. J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 199 (1979); see School Busing: Hearing on
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution and Legislation Relating to Transportation and Assignment
of Public School Pupils Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1311 (1972) (statement ofJulia Maulden).
137. G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 24 (1978).
138. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 935,
937-39 (1989).
139. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 233 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Higgins v. Board of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 444, 462-78 (W.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd,
508 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1974).
141. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 194-201 (W.D. Mich.
1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1974).
142. Higgins, 508 F.2d 779 (Grand Rapids); Oliver, 508 F.2d 178, (Kalamazoo).
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there has been a constitutional violation and would provide an op-
portunity for much more uniform results. Moreover, by selecting de
facto segregation as the standard rather than intentional segrega-
tion, the Court could have increased the number of school systems
that would be seen as engaging in invidious value inculcation.
The adoption of a standard that focused on the intent of the
school officials, however, adds credence to the notion that the un-
derlying harm which remedies for de jure segregation are to allevi-
ate is with the educational process in public schools. If the locus of
the harm was African-American school children, then a focus on de
facto segregation made more sense than a focus on the intent of
school officials. 143 African-American school children would suffer
just as much in de facto segregated schools as they would in dejure
segregated schools. 144 Invidious value inculcation theory sees the
locus of the underlying harm with respect to de jure segregation
with the value inculcating process. A focus on the intent of school
officials provides a better guide to elucidating the local meaning at-
tached to segregation which is essential in determining the existence
of invidious value inculcation.
In addition to establishing the de jure/de facto distinction, the
Keyes Court also adopted an evidentiary presumption. The "Keyes
presumption" states that a finding of dejure segregation in a mean-
ingful portion of a school district creates a prima facie case that de
jure segregation exists throughout the district.1 45 Once the plaintiff
establishes de jure segregation in a meaningful portion of the dis-
trict, the burden of proving otherwise shifts to the school district.
The Keyes presumption is not triggered until after the plaintiffs
prove that the school district engaged in de jure segregation in a
meaningful part of the school district. The entire district is under
the control of the same school authorities and is part of the same
community. The entire district, therefore, is inculcating the com-
munity's local values.' 46 If a significant portion of that school dis-
trict is shown to be engaged in invidious value inculcation, there is
reason to presume that such a situation exists in the entire school
143. See Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Uncertainty,
in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 27 (1977).
144. Id.
145. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201-03.
146. The Court appeared to retreat from the Keyes presumption in Dayton Board of
Education v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406 (1977). The Court decided 8-0 (with
Justice Marshall not participating) to vacate a school desegregation decree and remand
for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court
instructed the district court on remand to "determine how much incremental segrega-
tive effect [the school board's isolated] violations had on the racial distribution of the
Dayton school population as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared
to what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional violations. The remedy
must be designed to redress that difference." Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420. When the Day-
ton case reached the Supreme Court for the second time, the Court noted that the bar-
rier to the system-wide relief posed by Dayton I was overcome by resort to the Keyes
presumption. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 540-42
(1979). Thus, although the Court appeared to initially reject the Keyes presumption in
Dayton I, it appeared to restate the vitality of that presumption in Dayton H.
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district.1 47 In addition, if the entire school district was not seen as
tainted by invidious value inculcation, then it would have been much
more difficult to remedy the portion of the school district that was
inculcating the invidious value.
3. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I)-Limitation on State Action
The Supreme Court in Milliken 1148 addressed dejure segregation
of the Detroit Public School System. The plaintiffs in Milliken I
proved that the Detroit school district had engaged in dejure segre-
gation within its boundaries. 49  Therefore, the Detroit public
schools were engaged in invidious value inculcation. What was at
stake in Milliken I was the limitation to be placed on the ability to
remedy invidious value inculcation found in a given school district.
The boundaries of the Detroit Public School System were estab-
lished over a century before the litigation began in Milliken 1.150
The district court concluded that there were too few white students
to effectively desegregate public schools if the remedy was limited to
Detroit only.15 ' The Supreme Court had to decide whether or not
to view the suburban school districts as separate and distinct entities
from the Detroit School District for purposes of remedying the con-
stitutional violation that had occurred in Detroit public schools. 152
The Court concluded that to justify an interdistrict school deseg-
regation decree, the plaintiffs must show that a violation occurring
within one school district produced a significant segregative effect in
another.15 3 In other words, the intentionally segregative acts must
147. But see Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
3, 26. Professor Fiss argues that the Keyes presumption is based on a view that any errors
in determining the scope of the remedy for de jure segregation should be made in the
direction of findings that would support a broader integration remedy because integra-
tion is considered to be a preferable condition to separation, without regard to whether
it fits as a remedy for the defendant's violation. My argument can be contrasted with
Professor Fiss's. I argue that the Keyes presumption is based upon the view that invidi-
ous value inculcation either exists or does not exist with an entire school system. To
conclude that only a portion of a school system engaged in invidious value inculcation
ignores the fact that the entire system is in the same community and controlled by the
same individuals who are responsible for the value inculcation of the entire school
district.
148. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
149. Id at 724-31.
150. Id. at 748.
151. Id. at 735.
152. Id. at 743-45. In 1950 the city of Detroit had a population of approximately
1,900,000, which constituted 61% of the population in the metropolitan area. By 1970,
the population within the city had declined to approximately 1,500,000, which consti-
tuted only 36% of the population of the metropolitan area. There were 838,877 whites
and 660,428 blacks. The population of Detroit's suburbs more than doubled in that
twenty-year period. Most of the increased school population in the suburban school
districts was, therefore, of recent origin. Sedler, The Profound Impact of Milliken v. Brad-
ley, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1693, 1705 (1987).
153. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744-45.
1990] 1133
be a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.' M If the school
districts acted independently, however, the fact that intentional seg-
regation existed in one school system was simply not relevant to the
educational process in another school system.' 55
The values being inculcated in Detroit's public schools were pre-
sumed not to have tainted the value inculcating process of the other
school systems. A Detroit-only remedy was sufficient to eliminate
invidious value inculcation from the Detroit public schools, thus
limiting the remedy for invidious value inculcation to the bounda-
ries of the school system that was found to be inculcating the invidi-
ous value.' 56 The Court took this position in spite of the fact that
such a remedy prevented meaningful racial mixing of students.
The limitation placed on the remedy for invidious value inculca-
tion in Milliken I was by no means required. The Court could have
rejected the school boundaries limitation by focusing on any of
three considerations noted by Justice Marshall in his dissenting
opinion. First, evidence at trial showed that the state of Michigan
itself had taken actions contributing to the segregation in the
schools of Detroit. 15 7 Second, the Detroit Board of Education was
an agency of the state of Michigan. As such, its acts of racial dis-
crimination could be considered those of the state of Michigan for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 158 Finally, according to
Justice Marshall, "the District Court found that under Michigan law
and practice, the system of education was in fact a state school sys-
tem, characterized by relatively little local control and a large degree
of centralized state regulation with respect to both educational pol-
icy and the structure and operation of school districts."159 By view-
ing the violation of de jure segregation as that of the state's
educational program as opposed to that of each separate school dis-
trict, the Court could have treated the entire state's educational sys-
tem as one for purposes of remedying invidious value inculcation
within Detroit public schools. Cross-district busing would simply
have been viewed as an administrative inconvenience. Thus, the
Supreme Court could have expanded the remedy for invidious value
inculcation to encompass cross-district busing if necessary in order
to provide meaningful desegregation.
4. Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler-The Impact
of Subsequent Resegregation of Students
In Spangler, 160 the Supreme Court reviewed a district court order
154. Id. at 745.
155. Id.
156. As pointed out by Professor Lawrence, "[b]y holding that the Detroit district
court's choice of an inter-district remedy was in error, and that only an intra-district
remedy was warranted by the facts, the Supreme Court necessarily found that there was
no 'constitutional violation' existing outside of the boundaries of the Detroit school sys-
tem." Lawrence, supra note 127, at 20.
157. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 786 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
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requiring periodic adjustments of student assignments in order to
maintain the approximate amount of desegregation among students
as originally achieved.1 6 1 The Court held that once a school district
has implemented a racially-neutral attendance pattern for students,
a district court cannot require continued adjustments in order to
maintain a certain amount of desegregation. 162 The subsequent
resegregation of students is not part of the original constitutional
violation that the district court had the authority to remedy.163 Ac-
cordingly, the Court concluded that the subsequent resegregation
in Spangler was attributable primarily to choices of individuals to
relocate-not the school's efforts to further invidious value inculca-
tion.'6 Because resegregation was not caused by public school offi-
cials, the schools were not inculcating the invidious value.
The Court's conclusion that the subsequent resegregation was
not a part of the original constitutional violation was not inevitable.
The Court could have used an analysis similar to that employed in
Green 165 and concluded that the subsequent resegregation indicated
that the racially-neutral attendance pattern had never been origi-
nally established. The subsequent resegregation of students could
have been deemed a result of choices that had been conditioned by
the invidious value, thus allowing the invidious value inculcation to
continue.
5. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II)-Does Invidious Value
Inculcation Extend Beyond the Racial Composition of Public
Schools?
Even.if, as argued above, the harm produced by dejure segrega-
tion is invidious value inculcation, a nagging question persists. If de
jure segregation inculcated the invidious value, it stands to reason
that other elements of public school educational programs, includ-
ing teaching strategies, teacher, staff, and administrator attitudes,
and testing procedures, 166 were also used to inculcate the invidious
161. Id. at 434-36. When the court addressed the issue of periodic adjustments of
student school assignments, the unified Pasadena school district was not unitary with
respect to other aspects of its school system, such as hiring and promotion of teachers
and administrators. Id. at 436:
162. I& at 434-35.
163. Id at 435-37.
164. Id. at 435-36.
165. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
166. Lower federal courts have addressed various issues relating to teaching strate-
gies and testing procedures, see, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)
(striking down ability grouping instituted by school officials), aff'd sub noam. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc), and school testing procedures, see,
e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that the use of IQtests
to place children in special classes for the educable mentally retarded inculcated the
invidious value), aft'd, 793 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1984); see also supra note 87.
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value. Further, schools teach values not only by using administra-
tive rules and regulations governing student and teacher conduct
but also through the selection and exclusion of certain curricular
information.' 67 One could suspect that the traditional educational
program undervalues the contributions of African-Americans and
their ancestors.1 68 Should these elements be central in formulating
remedies for dejure segregation? After all, the nature and scope of
a segregation remedy must directly address and relate to the consti-
tutional violation.1 69
Milliken 11170 may provide insight into the limitation on the
Court's ability to eliminate invidious value inculcation in the entire
educational program of public schools. In Milliken II, the Supreme
Court once again focused on the Detroit Public School System 171
and affirmed a district court order approving remedial educational
components proposed by the Detroit School Board as part of the
remedy for de jure segregation.172 In formulating its order, the dis-
trict court determined that the state of Michigan was as responsible
for segregation of Detroit's public schools as the school system it-
self. Thus, the district court assigned responsibility for half of the
cost of the educational components of the desegregation plan to the
Detroit Public School System and the other half to the state of Mich-
igan.' 73 The state of Michigan objected to being made partially re-
sponsible for funding this remedy.' 74
The educational programs proposed by the Detroit School Board,
167. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
168. Some lower federal courts have included a requirement in their desegregation
decrees that schools eliminate racial bias in the curriculum. E.g., Berry v. School Dist.,
515 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Mich. 1981); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 506 F.
Supp. 657 (S.D. Ind. 1979); Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982 (D. Del. 1978), aft'd,
582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978). The potential for bias in the traditional education program
has not gone unnoticed by educational experts. See W. SEDLECEK & G. BROOKS, JR.,
RACISM IN AMERCAN EDUCATION 48-49 (1976). Attempts to address racial bias in the
traditional educational program during the 1960s and 1970s led to increased discussion
and implementation of multiethnic and multicultural educational components. Banks,
Race, Ethnicity and Schooling in the United States: Past, Present and Future, in MULTICULTURAL
EDUCATION IN WESTERN SOCIETIES 43 (1986). As a result, many textbooks were revised
in the 1970s to include more information about the experiences and cultures of diverse
ethnic groups. Id. at 47. A neo-conservative movement, however, developed in educa-
tion in the 1980s. This movement was characterized by a strong push for assimilation,
national pride, and patriotism. As a result of the influence of this movement, many
recent textbooks include less information about ethnic groups than their early-1970s
counterparts. Further, many school districts have abandoned their multicultural educa-
tion programs, placing ethnic issues on a low priority. Id. at 47.
As Professor Banks has noted, the teaching strategies, culture, norms, and other as-
pects of public schools indicate that many of the nation's educators have been influ-
enced little, if at all, by the myriad developments and publications in multiethnic
education. J. BANKS, MULTIETHNIC EDUCATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 12 (1981). As a
result, even though the student population in the United States is increasingly mul-
tiethnic, the curriculum in many schools remains Anglocentric.
169. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280.
170. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
171. For a discussion of Milliken I, see supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
172. 433 U.S. at 279.
173. Id. at 277.
174. Id. at 279.
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and approved by the district court, fell into four categories: read-
ing,' 75 in-service training for teachers and administrators, revised
testing procedures, and counseling and career guidance.' 76 The
purpose of the in-service training program was "to train profes-
sional and instructional personnel to cope with the desegregation
process" in order "to ensure that all students in a desegregated sys-
tem would be treated equally by teachers and administrators."' 77 A
testing program was adopted because the district court found that
black children were "especially affected by biased testing proce-
dures."'178 Counselors were included in the plan to address the psy-
chological pressures that undergoing desegregation would place on
Detroit's students.17 9
In upholding the district court's order, the Supreme Court noted
that the educational components of the desegregation plan were in-
tended to remedy the effect of de jure segregation on the Detroit
Public School System.' 80 Given the purpose of the in-service train-
ing, testing, and counseling and career guidance components, those
components were responsive to eliminating invidious value inculca-
tion from the educational program of Detroit's public schools be-
yond merely matters of racial composition. Even though the district
court concluded that the reading component was intended to eradi-
cate the effects of past discrimination, 181 that component was not
directly responsive to eliminating invidious value inculcation.
Teaching reading is more a part of the academic function of public
schools than the value inculcating function. The Court's approval
of the reading component, therefore, cannot be justified by looking
at public schools from the perspective of their value inculcating
function, but instead justification of the approval requires public
schools to be viewed with the perspective of their academic or sort-
ing functions. 182
175. The district court concluded that there was "no educational component more
directly associated with the process of desegregation than reading." Id at 275. The
General Superintendent of Detroit's schools was "to institute a remedial reading and
communications skills program '[t]o eradicate the effects of past discrimination."' Id.
This program was to be formulated and implemented by the superintendent and a com-
mittee of his selection. Id
176. Id. at 274-76.
177. Id. at 275-76.
178. Id at 276. The district court directed the Detroit School Board and the Michi-
gan Department of Education "to institute a testing program along the lines proposed
by the local school board in its original desegregation plan." Id
179. Id.
180. Id at 287-88.
181. Id at 275.
182. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. Although a portion of the holding
of Milliken II represents a deviation from the view that the harm resulting from dejure
segregation as invidious value inculcation, the deviation is not as great as it first appears.
The Detroit School Board implemented all of the educational components of the deseg-
regation plan. Of the four educational components, only the reading component was
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In Milliken II, the Court advised federal courts to "take into ac-
count the interests of state and local authorities in managing their
own affairs" when devising a remedy for de jure segregation.'8 3
The Court noted that the district court did not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the elected local school officials as to what educa-
tional components were beneficial to the school community.'8 4
This is consistent with the Supreme Court's previous pronounce-
ments that the education of the nation's youth is not the responsibil-
ity of federal courts, but rather, the responsibility rests primarily
with parents, teachers, and state and local officials. 18 5 Federal
courts lack both the expertise of educators and the accountability of
local and state educational officials.' 8 6 Federal courts, therefore,
cannot precisely ascertain the consequences of their intervention
into the educational programs of public schools.' 8 7
It is true that federal courts have invaded the province of public
school officials in a number of other cases. The Supreme Court has
authorized federal courts to resolve disputes impacting upon the ed-
ucational programs of public schools when basic constitutional val-
ues are "directly and sharply implicate[d]. 88 For example, the
Supreme Court decreed that school officials must provide students
with informal hearings prior to temporary suspensions from public
schools.'8 9 Given the frequency of student suspensions, the re-
quirement of informal hearings is a sizeable intrusion into what had
previously been the exclusive province of educators. 90 Library
not specifically directed toward the elimination of invidious value inculcation. Absent
the liability of a state defendant that would share the cost of the remedy, there was no
reason for local school authorities to argue for remedial programs sought by the Detroit
School Board in this case. It is within the authority of local school authorities to initiate
these programs on their own and to pay for them out of their own resources. As such,
Milliken II is only applicable in school desegregation cases in which local school officials
are in favor of adopting remedial programs and the state looms as a potential deep
pocket from which to obtain additional funding for the programs. For examples of such
cases, see, e.g., School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1310 (4th Cir. 1987); Little Rock
School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 436 (8th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1298-99
(8th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).
183. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280-81.
184. Id. at 275.
185. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Board
of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326
(1975); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
186. Rowey, 458 U.S. at 203; San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 42-43 (1973).
187. For an instructive discussion of how federal court intervention into the educa-
tional decisionmaking process attempting to produce positive academic results can go
awry, see the discussion of Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc), in D. HoRowrrz, THE
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 106-70 (1977).
188. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; see Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864-66
(1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
189. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975).
190. The United States Department of Education reported that for the 1983-1984
school year there were 10 suspensions in junior and senior high school for every 100
students. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION STUDY, supra note 5, at 99. Given that over
18,000,000 students were enrolled in Grades 7-12 in the Fall of 1983, id. at 37, there
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book removal decisions also are reviewable by federal courts to de-
termine whether or not the removal decisions are precipitated by
improper motives of school officials. 191 Further, the Supreme Court
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District'92 pro-
claimed that students have the right to freedom of speech within
public schools, as long as that speech is not "materially and substan-
tially" disruptive to the educational process and does not interfere
with the rights of others. 93 The Court has even invalidated state
statutes prohibiting the teaching of evolution19 4 and requiring the
teaching of creation theory when the theory of evolution is also
taught.195 School desegregation litigation, like constitutional litiga-
tion in other areas of public education, is a substantial invasion into
the autonomy of public school officials. Indeed, federal court super-
vision of public schools pursuant to desegregation orders could be
characterized as placing a school district into legal receivership. 96
In sum, the above decisions, and others, 197 have eroded the once
absolute power of school officials and the state over the educational
process. Despite the many intrusions by the Supreme Court into
the educational programs of public schools, the Court has stopped
far short of anything as pervasive as what would be required to elim-
inate invidious value inculcation from the traditional public school
educational program. For example, in order to address invidious
value inculcation in the curriculum, a court would have to approve,
or at least review, the offering and termination of courses and the
selection of textbooks and other instructional materials. To date,
the Supreme Court's intrusions into the educational programs of
public schools have been limited primarily to procedural rights' 98
were at least 1,800,000 suspensions potentially affected by the Court's decision in Goss in
the 1983-1984 school year alone.
191. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). In Pico, the plurality of the Court held that whenever
the decisive factor behind the decision to remove a book from a school library is the
intention to deny students access to ideas that school officials disagree with, the removal
decision violates the student's right to receive information. Id. at 870-72.
192. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
193. Id at 513.
194. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
195. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
196. Justice Powell described the district court's actions in supervising the Detroit
Public School desegregation in Milliken II as "virtually assum[ing] the role of school
superintendent and school board." Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 297 (Powell, J., concurring).
197. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, rehk'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981) (strik-
ing down a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments
purchased with private funds on the wall of each public classroom); School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating a state statute requiring bible reading in
public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that a state may not re-
quire the reading of an official state prayer in public schools even if pupils who wish to
remain silent or be excused may do so); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding it unconstitutional for states to require children in public
schools to salute the flag and pledge allegiance).
198. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding a state statute permitting
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and prohibitions against certain activities. 199 Even when the Court's
decisions have impacted directly on curricular material, the Court
has not specified curricular material that public schools should
teach. 200 Rather, the court has only prohibited actions that were
motivated by a desire to advance the interest of certain religious
groups.20 1
The reason for restricting the remedy for invidious value inculca-
tion primarily to school desegregation may be a recognition of the
limits of federal courts in addressing education issues. Courts
should certainly encourage public school officials to initiate pro-
grams to revise their traditional curriculum, but mandating such
programs is another issue entirely. Although this argument is pow-
erful, it reflects what Professor Minnow would call a "form ofjudi-
cial passivity" in the face of complexity.20 2 By showing deference,
courts are asserting that they have no power or responsibility to
act.2
03
II. Other Theories on the Harm Resulting from Dejure Segregation
of Public Schools
In the absence of an articulated theory by the Supreme Court ex-
plicating the constitutional harm produced by dejure segregation, a
number of theories have been developed to explain the purpose of
remedies for de jure segregation. These theories fall into roughly
three overlapping categories. The first category of theories views
the harm resulting from de jure segregation in terms of identifiable
harms to African-American students. 20 4 The specific harms that
these "remedial" theories focus on include lower educational
achievement, feelings of inferiority, societal discrimination suffered
by African-Americans, and distorted attendance patterns that re-
sulted from the existence of dejure segregation. A second category
of theories views the harm resulting from dejure segregation as the
student suspension without a hearing violative of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (holding that school offi-
cials are not immune from liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if they knew or
should have known that the action they took would violate the student's constitutional
rights).
199. See, e.g., Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (holding invalid under the Establishment Clause
a state statute forbidding the teaching of evolution in public schools unless the theory of
"creation science" was also taught); Stone, 449 U.S. 39 (striking dovm a Kentucky statute
requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments purchased with private finds
on the wall of each public classroom); Scempp, 374 U.S. 203 (invalidating school prayer
statute); Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (invalidating compulsory flag salute).
200. See, e.g., Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (striking down a statute requiring that when the
theory of evolution is presented, the theory of creationism must also be presented).
201. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding a
state statute prohibiting the use of any textbook discussing the theory of evolution viola-
tive of the Establishment Clauses).
202. Minnow,Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 83 (1987).
203. Id.
204. See infra notes 208-68 and accompanying text.
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embodiment of a failure of the political process that bases govern-
ment decisions on invidious motives. 205 A third category of theories
views the harm resulting from de jure segregation as an interpreta-
tive harm resulting from the meaning attached to segregation by so-
ciety. 20 6 Theories in this category view government actions
segregating public schools as stigmatizing African-Americans. This
stigmatic harm is distinct from any observable harm.
Although these theories suggest a number of different harms that
result from de jure segregation, none of them are based on the
value inculcating function of public schools. As a result, they gener-
ally do not explain why racial mixing is necessary for purposes of
remedying dejure segregation in public schools but not other gov-
ernment services provided by states.20 7 The failure to ground these
theories in the value inculcating function of public schools is a seri-
ous shortcoming.
A. Remedial Theories
Remedial theories look backward and attempt to ascertain the ef-
fect of de jure segregation on its victims. Once the harm is deter-
mined, the purpose of remedy, according to the remedial theories,
is to restore victims to the position that they would have occupied
absent the constitutional violation.208 Remedial theories generally
assume that the impact of the harm resulting from dejure segrega-
tion is not on the value inculcating process of public schools, but
rather its effects on African-American school children. In ascertain-
ing the harm caused by dejure segregation, remedial theories focus
on four overlapping effects attributed to dejure segregation on Af-
rican-American school children: (1) educational harms; (2) psycho-
logical harms; (3) general societal discrimination; and (4) distorted
school attendance patterns.
It is important to note a problem with most of the remedial theo-
ries. The remedies for de jure segregation are being provided to
African-American school children today. Yet many of the victims of
de jure segregation graduated or left public schools before the im-
plementation of any remedy. The desegregation of today's public
school children cannot possibly restore those victims to the position
they would have occupied absent the constitutional violation. As a
result, many victims of de jure segregation are not provided with a
remedy at all. As a result, remedial theories generally can not ac-
complish the goals they are devised to achieve.
205. See infra notes 269-84 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 285-92 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 282; Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 738.
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1. Educational Achievement
If the harm resulting from de jure segregation of public schools is
viewed as lower educational achievement by African-American
school children than by their white counterparts, then in order to
determine unitary status, courts should examine objective educa-
tional achievement criteria.20 9 This theory requires the Court to
view public schools primarily from the perspective of their academic
function.210 As discussed below, viewing public schools from the
academic function, as opposed to the value inculcating function, will
force courts to make decisions requiring technical expertise in edu-
cational methodology.2 11
Viewing the harm resulting from dejure segregation as lower ed-
ucational achievement suggests that public school districts have not
obtained unitary status until the performance of African-American
students, as determined by objective educational achievement crite-
ria, is essentially equal to that of their white counterparts.212 In de-
termining unitary status, courts should therefore look first to the
Green factors discussed above.21 3 In addition to applying the Green
factors, courts should also consider issues related to the educational
achievement of African-American students, such as scores on stan-
dardized tests, drop out rates, graduation rates, and the percentage
of students attending post-secondary education institutions and un-
dertaking full-time employment. The Richmond, Virginia School
Board advanced such an argument in the context of a school deseg-
regation termination case, School Board v. Baliles.214
With the exception of the reading component in Milliken 11,215 the
Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed remedies for de jure
segregation based on their impact on the educational achievement
of African-American school children.21 6 It was not until Green that
the Court made it clear that racial balancing must occur in order to
209. One could argue that for school districts where desegregation of the student
body is obtainable, the determination of unitary status should be based on the Green
factors. See supra note 10. But where desegregation is not viable, determination of uni-
tary status should be based on academic components. See School Bd. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d
1308, 1312 (4th Cir. 1987).
210. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
211. See infra notes 224-36 and accompanying text.
212. See Baliles, 829 F.2d at 1312; Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the Constitutional
Right of Equal Educational Opportunity and an Appropriate Remedial Process, 63 B.U.L. REV.
129-34 (1983).
213. See supra note 10.
214. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308. Although the School Board in Baliles argued that using
educational achievement factors to determine unitary status was appropriate for a school
district that could not desegregate its students, id. at 1312, these factors could also be
applied in determining whether school districts in which desegregation is obtainable
have achieved unitary status.
215. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
216. In Milliken II, the Court approved a district court opinion when the school board
argued that remedial education courses should be included in the remedy for Detroit's
dejure segregation. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). In Milliken II, however, it was the
school board that argued for the remedial programs-not the district court. Questions
concerning the ability of a court to make decisions requiring educational expertise were
therefore not presented. See supra text accompanying notes 170-87.
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remedy the harm resulting from de jure segregation. 217 Although
the Court may have hoped for significant improvement in the aca-
demic achievement of African-American school children from the
implementation of school desegregation decrees, studies existing at
the time of Green shed doubt on the ability of racial desegregation,
as opposed to economic class desegregation, to have a significant
impact on academic achievement by African-Americans. 18
As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,219 Congress commis-
sioned a study, commonly referred to as the Coleman Report, to
determine "the lack of availability of equal educational opportunity"
for individuals of different race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin.220 In the fall of 1965, a research team led by James Coleman of
Johns Hopkins University and Ernest Campbell of Vanderbilt Uni-
versity surveyed some 4,000 public schools. 22 1 The research team
not only scrutinized educational facilities, materials, curricula, and
laboratories, but also analyzed educational achievement as deter-
mined by standardized tests.222 Although the primary purpose of
the study was to measure how school resources affected pupil
achievement, the Coleman Report also assessed the effect of deseg-
regation on academic performance. 22 3
In order to determine the effect of desegregation on student
achievement, the Coleman Report compared the achievement levels
of four groups of African-American students: (1) those in majority-
217. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
218. J. COLEMAN, EQ.UALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 331 (1966) [hereinafter
COLEMAN REPORT].
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-1 (1988).
220. Coleman Report, supra note 218, at iii.
221. D. RAvrrCH, supra note 123, at 168.
222. COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 218, at iii.
223. Id. The findings from the Coleman Report sent conflicting signals regarding the
efficacy of school desegregation in improving the achievement level of African-American
students. According to Ravitch, among the major findings of the survey were:
[1.] Most American children attended schools where almost all of their fel-
low pupils were of the same race.
[2.] Schools attended by white students had some advantages in physical
resources over those attended by blacks, but the differences were far less
than anticipated, or, as one analyst pointed out, "American schools were
virtually separate but equal" at the time of the survey.
[3.] [Academic] achievement seemed to be related to the student's family
background rather than to the quality of the school.
[4.] Next to the student's own family background, the other factors related
to achievement were social composition of the school and the student's
sense of control of the environment.
D. RAvrrCH, supra note 123, at 168-69, see COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 218, at 4-23.
The study also found "that variations in the facilities and curriculums [sic] of the
school account for relatively little variation in pupil achievement insofar as this is mea-
sured by standard tests." COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 218, at 21. The study did, how-
ever, note that variations in facilities appeared to have a greater impact on the
educational achievement of African-American students than upon white students. Id. at
22.
1990] 1143
white classes; (2) those in classes that were half black and half white;
(3) those in majority-black classes; and (4) those in classes with no
whites.224 African-American students in the first group generally re-
ceived the highest scores on the standardized tests, although the dif-
ferences from group to group were small.2 25 African-American
student achievement, however, did not rise in proportion to the
presence of white classmates.22 6 Although African-American stu-
dents in majority-white classes generally had the highest scores,
black students in all-black classes actually scored as high or higher
than those in half-black or majority-black schools.227 Moreover, in
the Midwest, some African-American students in all-black classes
outperformed even those African-Americans in majority-white
classes. 22s Against the background of the most comprehensive
study of academic achievement in public schools to date, it was un-
likely that the Green Court would have viewed the constitutional
harm attributable to de jure segregation as reduced academic
achievement by African-American school children.
Notwithstanding the findings contained in the Coleman Report,
other problems exist in viewing the remedies for dejure segregation
as directed towards remedying inadequate academic achievement.
First, as an empirical matter, no consensus exists as to the correla-
tion, if any, between desegregated schooling and student achieve-
ment. 229 If indeed school desegregation does not significantly
improve the academic performance of African-American children,
then desegregation decrees, despite their significant costs and dis-
ruption to the educational process have only a marginal impact on
remedying the effects of de jure segregation. In addition, most of
the research on the effects of school desegregation on African-
American students is by necessity measured by standardized
224. COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 218, at 31-32.
225. Id. at 29. Because there was no court-ordered busing in 1965 when the Cole-
man Report was conducted, the African-Americans who attended majority-white schools
presumably lived in integrated neighborhoods. Their slightly better performance may
therefore have been simply reflective of their more privileged socioeconomic position.
If so, then the academic performance of black students in majority-white classes adds
force to one of the major findings of the study, that the socioeconomic status of the
student was a strong determinant in academic achievement. See supra note 223.
226. COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 218, at 1-2.
227. Id. at 31.
228. Id. at 32.
229. Court Ordered School Busing: Hearings on S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S. 1647, S. 1743,
and S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1981) (statement of HerbertJ. Walberg, Professor of Educa-
tion, University of Illinois, Chicago); T. CRAIN, MAKING DESEGREGATION WORK 70
(1982); Mahard and Crain, Research on Minority Achievements in Desegregated Schools, in THE
CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 103-25 (C. Russell & W. Hawley eds. 1983);
See Green, Thinking Realistically About Integration, 16 NEw PERSPECTIVES 35 (Fall 1984);
Mahard, Narot & Stephan, School Desegregation: An Evaluation of Predictions Made in Brown
v. Board of Education, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 217 (1978); School Desegregation: Lessons of the
First Twenty-Five Years, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1-133 (Summer 1978); see also Dowell
v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1534 (10th Cir. 1989) (Baldock,J., dissenting) (noting
the testimony of Dr. Walberg, Dr. Crain and Dr. Sampson that segregated schools in-
hibit learning, but that studies conflict concerning the effects of desegregation on
achievement), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1521 (1990).
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achievement test. Yet evaluating academic achievement in terms of
performance on basic skills tests is a narrow way of thinking about a
child's education.2 30
Second, concentrating on educational achievement criteria would
require a shift in the focus of court supervision of segregated public
school districts. 231 Courts would have to design remedies directed
toward improving educational achievement of African-American
children and not emphasizing desegregation. Even if courts were
willing to shift their focus from desegregation to educational pro-
grams, there is considerable disagreement over what academic pro-
grams lead to enhanced educational performance by African-
Americans. 232 A court would be treading on uncertain ground if it
230. Hilliard, Reintegration for Education: Black Community Involvement with Black Students
in Schools, in BLACK EDUCATION: A QUEST FOR Egurry AND EXCELLENCE 202 (1989). The
child's education encompasses much more than the ability to choose the correct re-
sponse on a standardized multiple choice examination. These standardized exams mea-
sure only a few narrow facets of the child's academic and intellectual development. The
rigid format of these exams does not allow for measurement or acknowledgement of the
acquisition of many important aspects of intellectual development (e.g. creativity, diver-
gent thought, the ability to synthesize information, social skills, etc.). In addition, stan-
dardized tests are alleged to exhibit cultural bias, as well as a questionable correlation
between the skills these exams test and the skills the child needs for future success.
231. The primary spokesperson among those that have argued that remedies for de
jure segregation of public schools should focus on educational achievement of African-
American school children rather than school desegregation has been Professor Derrick
Bell. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegrega-
tion Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, in
SHADES OF BROwv: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 124 (D. Bell ed.
1980); Bell, Civil Rights Commitment and the Challenge of Changing Conditions in Urban School
Cases, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 194, 201 (1981); see also Chang, supra note
212.
Likewise, Professor Shane argues that for school systems in which it is not possible to
obtain integration, court decrees should be directed toward improving the educational
effectiveness of the schools that minority children attend. Shane, School Desegregation
Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1117-26 (1984). Ac-
cording to Shane, in cases where a court regards integration as impossible or impractica-
ble, his fair governance principal will lead to a remedial mix perhaps identical to
Professor Bell's. Shane distinguishes his theory from Bell's on the ground that Bell
believes that educational programs should take priority over integrative efforts, whereas
for him integration is the most important measure to pursue. Id. at 1126-27.
232. The late Senior Assistant to the Chancellor for Instruction, New York City Pub-
lic Schools, Ronald Edmonds, did pioneering work, in what he termed "effective
schools" for minority children. He identified five characteristics that effective schools
for minority children have in common: (1) strong administrative leadership; (2) a cli-
mate of expectation "in which no children are permitted to fall below minimum but
efficacious levels of achievement"; (3) an orderly but not unduly rigid atmosphere;
(4) an emphasis on pupil acquisition of basic school skills; and (5) frequent monitoring
of pupil progress. Edmonds, Effective Education for Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or
Confirmed, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 121 (D.
Bell ed. 1980); see also Bossert, Dwyer, Rowan & Lee, The Instructional Management Role of
the Principal, 3 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 34-64 (1982). The "effective schools" literature has
been criticized on the following grounds: (1) the research relied upon by the studies
utilized small and narrow samples that severely limited their generalizability; (2) only
one study was longitudinal-that is, studying the changes in the subjects over an ex-
tended period of time-thus preventing conclusions being drawn concerning the staying
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ordered educational programs designed to improve the academic
achievement of African-American students. This uncertainty could
make it difficult for courts to formulate and supervise an effective
remedy. 233
Finally, the educational programs that would arguably have the
most significant impact on educational achievement of African-
American school children would probably be the most difficult for
courts to implement and supervise.234 For example, the late Senior
Assistant to the Chancellor for the Instruction of New York City
Public Schools, Ronald Edmonds, has noted that among the charac-
teristics of effective schools for minority school children are strong
administrative leadership, a school climate where it is expected that
all children can and will learn, and an educational atmosphere that
is orderly. 23 5 Yale's ProfessorJames Comer, although agreeing with
most of the characteristics articulated by Edmonds, has also empha-
sized the need for parental involvement in the education of minority
children.23 6 Any court would have a very difficult time formulating,
implementing, and supervising measures that would produce these
characteristics in public schools, assuming it is possible to achieve
such results through court-ordered remedies at all.
2. Feelings of Inferiority
In Brown I ChiefJustice Warren specifically noted that segregation
of African-American children from other children of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of in-
feriority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way that is unlikely to be undone. 237 Chief
Justice Warren buttressed his conclusion in Brown I that segregation
in public schools inflicted psychological harm on African-Americans
with evidence from seven social science sources. 238 Racial segrega-
tion tends to create feelings of inferiority and personal humiliation
power of effective schools over time; (3) the studies were mostly correlational, thus beg-
ging the question on cause and effect; (4) the definition of effective schools masks the
fact that most of the inner-city schools identified as effective still have lower mean scores
than do more affluent schools within the same district; and (5) there is a tendency for
studies in effective schools to compare exceptionally bad schools with exceptionally
good schools. See Comer, Haynes & Hamilton-Lee, School Power: A Model for Improving
Black Student Achievement, in BLACK EDUCATION: A QUEST FOR EQurrY AND EXCELLENCE
191 (1989). In addition, Ron Edmonds's effective education theory has been specifically
criticized on the grounds that neither parental involvement nor community involvement
was considered an important variable in effective education for minority students. See
Comer, Haynes & Hamilton-Lee, supra, at 192; Hilliard, supra note 230, at 201.
233. See supra note 187.
234. See Cohen, Defining Racial Equality in Education, 16 UCLA L. REV. 255 (1969); see
also Kirp, Community Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1355,
1367 (1970) (stating that no single pattern of educational interaction is likely to produce
educational equality).
235. Edmonds, supra note 232, at 121; see supra note 220.
236. Comer, Haynes & Hamilton-Lee, supra note 232, at 190; see also J. COMER,
SCHOOL POWER 125-45 (1980).
237. 347 U.S. at 494.
238. K.B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY DEVEL-
OPMENT (Mid century White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); E. FRA-
ZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 674-81 (1949); G. MRYDAL, AN AMERICAN
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in African-American youths, whose self-esteem is soon replaced with
self-hatred, rejection of their racial group, and frustration.23 9
The argument characterizing the harm resulting from dejure seg-
regation in public schools as feelings of inferiority isolates segrega-
tion in public schools as the cause of feelings of inferiority in
African-American school children. The social science evidence cited
by the Court in Brown I, 240 however, never isolated segregation in
public schools as the cause of the feelings of inferiority of African-
American school children. For instance, the "doll study" by Ken-
neth and Mamie Clark suggested that black children considered
themselves to be less worthy than white children but did not identify
school segregation as the independenit cause of the psychological
harm.241 Further, the study edited by Witmer and Kotinsky ana-
lyzed the effect of various environmental factors, including school
segregation, that mold the development of the human personal-
ity. 242 The study pointed out that children who are not treated with
respect subconsciously learn that they are not worthy of respect and
that others like them are not worthy of respect either.248 Finally, the
survey of social scientists conducted by Deutscher and Chein to de-
termine whether prevailing social science opinion supported the be-
lief that enforced racial segregation had detrimental effects, asked
whether segregation had a harmful psychological effect on the seg-
regated group-not whether segregation in public schools had a
DILEMMA (1944); H. WITMER & R. KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING: THE FACT-
FINDING REPORT OF THE MIDCENTURY WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND
YOUTH (1952); Chein, What Are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of
Equal Facilities? 3 INT'LJ. OPINION AND ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational
Costs, in DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE 44 (R. Macver ed. 1949); Deutscher &
Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26J.
PSYCHOL. 259 (1948); see Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
Doubt has always been expressed in a number of diverse corners as to whether the
social science evidence cited in Brown I actually influenced thejustices. See Cahn,Juris-
prudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157-58 & n.16 (1955); Van Den Haag, Pre'udice About
Prejudice, in THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY (1957). Regardless, the social science evidence was
useful in establishing the general meaning attached to segregation.
239. R. KLUGER, supra note 92, at 556.
240. See supra note 238.
241. See I. NEWBY, CHALLENGE TO THE COURT 32 (1969); P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 183 (1972). The study was conducted with 253 African-
American children, between the ages of three and seven, many of whom were too young
to attend public school. The children were given identical white and brown dolls. The
study results demonstrated that African-American children infrequently preferred the
white doll over the brown doll, associating the white doll with "good" qualities, and the
brown doll with "bad" qualities. Among the three year olds, 75% were aware of the
racial difference of the doll. Since many of the children were too young to have attended
public school, the public school system could not have been directly responsible for
promoting the negative racial self-images in these children. I. NEWBY, supra, at 21-32.
242. Witmer & Kotinsky, supra note 238, at 237.
243. Id
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harmful psychological effect. 244 It is true that some of the social sci-
ence studies cited by the Supreme Court in Brown I noted the strate-
gic role that segregation in public schools played in contributing to
the harmful psychological effect of segregation. 245 The social sci-
ence evidence, in general, however, did not indicate that the psycho-
logical harm suffered by African-American school children was
attributable solely to school segregation as opposed to other envi-
ronmental factors, such as non-school segregation.246
Indeed, some commentators have argued, based on studies cited
by the Supreme Court in Brown I, that school segregation was not
the principal cause of the feelings of inferiority of African-American
children on the ground that the children already had such feelings
before they entered public school. 247 Phrasing the harm resulting
from de jure segregation of public schools as feelings of inferiority,
therefore, may not be justified by the social science evidence cited
by the Court in Brown I.
In addition to the conclusions that can be drawn from the social
science data relied upon by the Court in Brown I, there are addi-
tional reasons to reject the notion that the harm resulting from de
jure segregation is feelings of inferiority. First, there is no consen-
sus that African-American children that attend desegregated schools
possess a higher self-esteem than those who do not.248 The remedy
of school desegregation, therefore, may not be effective at alleviat-
ing any feelings of inferiority which may exist. Second, feelings of
inferiority may have disparate causes, such as socioeconomic status,
that cannot be adequately addressed by public school authorities. It
may prove difficult to separate out feelings of inferiority related to
race from such feelings related to other causes. Even if social scien-
tists feel confident in claiming the ability to make such a separation,
it is doubtful that courts will be confident enough to base a decision
to terminate a desegregation order on this kind of social science
data.249
244. About 90% of the respondents agreed that segregation does have a harmful
psychological affect on the segregated group, with only 2% disagreeing. Deucher &
Chein, supra note 238, at 259, 265.
245. See WrrMER & KOTINSIY, supra note 238, at 257; Chein, supra note 238, at 234.
246. Kenneth Clark admitted in his testimony in Briggs v. Elliot, cited in Brown I, that it
was impossible to isolate the particular effects of school segregation from the effects of
other forms of segregation. Brigs, 98 F. Supp. 529, 547-46 (E.D.S.C. 1951), vacated and
remanded, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), on remand, 132 F. Supp. 776 (1955); see I. NEawBY, supra
note 241, at 31 (1969).
247. See I. NEwBY, supra note 241; Gregor, The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation:
An Assessment, 14 W. REs. L. REV. 621, 627 (1963).
248. The research concerning the effects of desegregation on personality develop-
ment is simply inadequate to determine the impact of segregated schooling on personal-
ity development. See Epps, Minority Children: Desegregation, Self-Evaluation, and Achievement
Orientation, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 85, 95 (W. Hawley ed. 1981); St.John,
The Effects of School Desegregation on Children: A New Look at the Research Evidence, in RACE
AND SCHOOLING IN THE CrIT 84, 90-92 (198 1); Cook, Social Science and School Desegregation:
Did We Mislead the Supreme Court?, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BuLL. 420, 423-26
(1979); Stephan, School Desegregation: An Evaluation of Predictions Made in Brown v. Board
of Education, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL. 217, 226-28 (1978).
249. Also, the allocation of the burden of proof might become dispositive as to
whether or not unitary status has been obtained. The Supreme Court in Green placed
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3. Providing Equal Educational Opportunity
Americans believe that positions of social advantage should be
awarded on the basis of individual merit, not ascribed on the basis
of ancestral heritage. 250 An integral part of the American system of
meritocracy is the public school system.25 ' Decisions of public
schools are important factors in determining future occupational
opportunities. 252 The sorting function performed by public schools
is an application of the liberal educational policy that dominates
public schools, which focuses on individual achievement based on
merit.253
All school children should have the opportunity to compete to the
best of their ability in this meritocracy. In order to make public
schools consistent with the American meritocratic tradition,254
therefore, it is necessary to desegregate public schools. Allowing
African-American school children to attend schools with white
school children enables African-Americans to compete fairly for
positions of social advantage. 255
If the goal of school desegregation is to eliminate societal discrim-
ination by providing equal educational opportunity, then desegrega-
tion plans should remain in effect until this lofty goal has been
obtained. There is no consensus, however, that a correlation exists
between desegregated schooling and adult "life chances. '256 In ad-
dition, school desegregation cannot make up for racial discrimina-
tion in housing or employment. Further, desegregation of public
the burden on the school district to eliminate racial discrimination. Green, 391 U.S. at
437-39. School districts, therefore, appear to bear the burden of demonstrating unitary
status. See Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 96 (5th Cir. 1983).
250. Many former Presidents and Vice-Presidents have manifested their belief in
equality of opportunity. See Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportu-
nity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 295, 362-63 (1988) (quoting: Ron-
ald Reagan, "equal opportunity at the starting line of life, but no compulsory tie for
everyone at the finish"; Richard Nixon, "a day when every child in this land has ... an
equal chance to go just as high as his talents will take him"; Hubert Humphrey, "I'll take
my stand, as I always have, on equal opportunity...").
251. The public school system has been described as a democratic school system,
because public schools are free and open to all minors regardless of race, creed, color,
national origin, socioeconomic class, and demonstrated or presumed academic abilities.
D. RAvrrcH, supra note 123.
252. See supra note 35.
253. M. APPLE, supra note 78, at 18.
254. See CUBBERLEY, PUBLiC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1947).
255. Justice Marshall recently noted that education is often the only route by which
the poor may become "full participants" in our society. Kadramas v. Dickinson Pub.
Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 469-71 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
256. "Life chances" is defined by Professor Levin as "a child's future ability as an
adult to participate fully in the social, economic, and political life of society. More nar-
rowly, 'life chances' may be considered in terms of such outcomes as ultimate earnings,
occupational status, and political efficacy." Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts:
The Role of Social Science Evidence, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (1975). There is a
complex multitude of psychological, social, genetic, political, economic, and educational
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schools cannot account for other forms of discrimination that have
negatively impacted the African-American community.
If the justification for school desegregation is the eradication of
societal discrimination, then desegregation is simply an inadequate
remedy to accomplish such a sublime goal. "One vehicle can carry
only a limited amount of baggage. ' 25 7 Remedies for de jure segre-
gation alone cannot provide the equal opportunity that is part of the
American meritocratic notion. The Supreme Court recognized as
much in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education:258
We are concerned in these cases with the elimination of the dis-
crimination inherent in the dual school systems, not with myriad
factors of human existence which can cause discrimination in a
multitude of ways on racial, religious or ethnic grounds .... The
elimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large task
and one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader
purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities. 259
4. Distorted School Attendance Patterns
Desegregation can be seen as rectifying distorted school attend-
ance patterns caused by dejure segregation. 26 0 This theory was ex-
plicitly proposed by the Supreme Court in its unanimous opinion in
influences that can determine an individual's occupational attainments and earnings.
The actual effect of elementary and secondary education and of a particular educational
environment is particularly difficult to trace because the outcomes that must be reviewed
are far removed in both time and context from the education process. Id at 218.
Despite the difficulty of measuring the precise effect that desegregation will have on
life chances, it is possible to formulate a hypotheses that can be empirically tested.
Much of the literature on schooling and adult incomes assumes that education produces
verbal and mathematical skills as well as other knowledge that translate into higher pro-
ductivity in the marketplace and therefore higher earnings. See generally supra note 234.
Accordingly, the effect of schooling on income is determined by the effect that schooling
has on skills and knowledge. Still, as noted earlier, there is no consensus on the impact
of desegregation on academic achievement. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying
text.
257. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971).
258. Id
259. Id
260. A variant of the replicating-attendance-pattern theory can be found in Brown I
where the Court was concerned with vindicating the associational rights of African-
American school children. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (discussing the psychological effects
of segregation). This concern is also implicit in Brown II where the Court indicated the
necessity of guaranteeing the "admission [of African-American] children to public
schools as soon as practicable on a non-discriminatory basis." Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
Professor Wechsler rejected the notion that Brown I can be justified with reference to
the associational harm suffered by African-American school children in segregated
schools. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34
(1959). Wechsler doubts that Brown I rested solely upon the determination that segre-
gation caused injury to black children because he believes that the evidence of the harm
caused by de jure segregation was both inadequate and conflicting. Id. at 32-33. The
portion of Wechsler's article asserting that segregation did not harm African-Americans
has been persuasively refuted. See Black, supra note 89, at 421; Heyman, The ChiefJustice,
Racial Segregation, and the Friendly Critics, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 104 (1961); Pollak, Racial Dis-
crimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
Wechsler, however, also argues that Brown I did not rest upon the notion that segrega-
tion interfered with the right of African-Americans to associate with whites. According
to Wechsler, if one concludes that segregation is a denial of the freedom of association,
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Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton j).261 In Dayton I, the
Court remanded a desegregation plan to determine, among other
issues, how much of an incremental segregative effect was produced
by the constitutional violations of Dayton school officials on the ra-
cial distribution of Dayton's school population. 262 According to the
Court, the remedy designed by the district court should only redress
the additional segregative effect attributable to the constitutional vi-
olation by the Dayton Public School System.268
Because remedies for de jure segregation of public schools ad-
dress the cumulative effects of discriminatory actions that occur over
a considerable period of time, however, it is virtually impossible to
ascertain what amount of desegregation would have existed absent
the discriminatory conduct of school officials. Any desegregation
remedy ordered by a federal court to correct distorted school at-
tendance patterns caused by dejure segregation would be based on
arbitrary considerations and, at the very best, would be specula-
tive.26 4 Because of the arbitrary nature of such a remedy, a theory
resting remedies for dejure segregation upon a notion of correcting
distorted school attendance patterns would be difficult to defend.
Even if rectifying distorted school patterns is a viable theory to
explain remedies for dejure segregation, it suffers from another de-
fect. Such a remedy does not place all victims of discrimination in
the position that they would have occupied absent the constitutional
violation. Absent the discriminatory conduct by school officials,
school children who are not transported to achieve racial balancing
remedies will most likely be given an integrated education at their
neighborhood school.265 Students who are transported to correct
distorted school patterns will be adversely impacted by the negative
consequences of being transported beyond their neighborhood
schools. At a minimum, such children will incur additional travel
time to and from school. Their education may also suffer because
then its remedy-integration-forces an association upon those for whom it is unpleas-
ant or repugnant and, as such, would be a denial of their associational rights. Wechsler,
supra, at 34. One must ask, therefore, whether "[g]iven a situation where the state must
practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who wish it or
imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding
that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?" I& at 34.
261. Dayton 1, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court; Justice Marshall did not participate in the decision. For further discussion of
Dayton I, see supra note 146.
262. id at 420.
263. Id.
264. Justice Rehnquist recognized as much in Dayton I by noting the difficulty of the
task of determining the incremental segregative effect. Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 420.
265. See Dworkin, supra note 143, at 27.
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the children and their parents may be unable to participate as effec-
tively in extracurricular school programs. The negative conse-
quences of providing such children with a desegregated education
may therefore actually outweigh the benefit they would receive from
a desegregated education. In such circumstances, the children not
only are not placed in the position that they would have occupied
absent the constitutional violation but may be made worse off by the
remedy than before.2 66
5. Summary
None of the remedial theories appears to provide an adequate ex-
planation for the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurispru-
dence.2 67 All of the remedial theories, except for the theory related
to correcting distorted school patterns, rely in part on an assump-
tion that desegregation will produce certain measurable positive re-
sults. Social science evidence, however, does not necessarily
support the conclusion that school desegregation will increase edu-
cational achievement of minority students, eliminate feelings of in-
feriority of minority students, or provide minority students with
enhanced occupational chances as adults.2 68 The theory asserting
that remedies for dejure segregation are justified because they rep-
licate attendance patterns makes school desegregation remedies ar-
bitrary. It is simply impossible to ascertain what the school
attendance patterns would have been absent the constitutional vio-
lation by school officials. It would appear, therefore, that if there is
an underlying theory explicating the harm resulting from de jure
segregation, it does not lie with the remedial theories articulated
above.
B. Theories Regarding the Failure of the Political Process
Professor Dworkin has argued that school desegregation can be
explained with reference to how prejudice corrupts the political pro-
cess. 269 According to Professor Dworkin, constitutional rights to a
racially balanced school are given because there is a high antecedent
probability that political judgments regarding school assignments
266. Id.
267. See also id. (rejecting the theory that integration is a right).
268. A number of social scientists have conducted studies on the impact of school
desegregation. These studies have generally attempted to measure the impact of school
desegregation on the following: (1) the educational attainment of minority students;
(2) the self-esteem of blacks; (3) the prejudice of whites towards blacks; and (4) the
prejudice of blacks towards whites. Conclusions about these matters have been tenta-
tive. See, Cook, Social Science and School Desegregation: Did We Mislead the Supreme Court? 5
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BuLL. 420 (1979); Stephen, School Desegregation: An
Evaluation of Predictions Made in Brown v. Board of Education, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL.
217 (1978).
269. Dworkin, supra note 143, at 28-30; see also Simon, Racially Preudiced Governmental
Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1049 (1978) (noting that racial prejudice prevents the normal func-
tioning of democratic processes and that those processes cannot adequately protect
groups against which prejudice is directed).
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will be influenced by preferences based on racial prejudice. 270 It is
the antecedent probability that school assignment decisions will be
based on prejudice against African-Americans that justifies judicial
intervention. In order to eliminate this corrupting influence in the
political process, Professor Dworkin argues, it is necessary for
courts to order racial balancing remedies. 271
Pursuant to this theory, it appears that unitary status must await
one of two conditions. Either the background of individual
prejudices against which political decisions are made must change
or members of the disadvantaged minority must assume political
power over school assignment decisions to such a degree that those
decisions are no longer corrupted by the prejudice against them.2 72
Courts addressing unitary status should, therefore, assess commu-
nity attitudes regarding prejudice towards African-Americans. If the
relevant federal court is certain that prejudice against African-Amer-
icans has abated in the community where the schools exist, then the
school system has achieved unitary status. Alternatively, if African-
Americans make up a significant portion of those in positions to
make student school assignments, then the court should conclude
that unitary status has been obtained.
Professor Dworkin's argument cannot explain why courts should
have ordered desegregation as a remedy for de jure segregation.
The harm that Professor Dworkin sees as derived from de jure seg-
regation is basing government decisions on racial prejudices. As
pointed out by Professor Yudof, if the government action would
have been taken absent the consideration of racial prejudices, then
the harm noted by Dworkin would apparently not exist.273 Use of
race-neutral means to make school assignments, such as neighbor-
hood attendance policies, should eliminate the harm Dworkin has
identified. Assuming that segregation was the result or a corrupting
influence in the political process, this influence could, therefore, be
eliminated by corrective measures far short of mandatory racial
mixing.2 74
Another argument based on the corrupting influence of the polit-
ical process has been articulated by Professor Shane.275 According
to Professor Shane, the harm resulting from de jure segregation is
the vulnerability of African-American school children in segregated
270. Dworkin, supra note 143, at 28-29.
271. Id. at 30.
272. Id
273. YUDOF, supra note 135, at 106.
274. Professor Yudof also makes this attack on Professor Dvorkin's theory. See
YUDoI, supra note 135, at 106.
275. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 1041 (1984).
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schools.276 Professor Shane asserts that racial segregation renders
minority students "systematically vulnerable to hostile or insensitive
treatment. '"277 In specific, according to Professor Shane, segregated
schools "effectively subjugate minority students in the competition
for educational resources and deprive[] them of any basis for rea-
sonable confidence in the evenhanded administration of their
schools." 278
Professor Shane notes that African-Americans suffer from segre-
gation, not because African-American children would be better off
going to school with whites, but because they are largely "powerless
to partake of an educational program that is not hostile" to them.2 7 9
Desegregation is thus the appropriate remedy for de jure segrega-
tion280 because it disperses African-American school children
among white students and thereby increases the difficulty of subju-
gating the educational interests of African-American school chil-
dren.28 Judicial intervention is necessary to implement fully the
remedial measures that Professor Shane's "fair governance" re-
quires, including integration of students. 282
There are several problems with Professor Shane's theory. First,
as he acknowledges, his theory cannot be squared with the Supreme
Court's acceptance of a de facto/dejure distinction. 285 If the consti-
tutional violation was rendering African-American school children
vulnerable to hostile or insensitive treatment, this violation would
occur irrespective of the character of the segregation.
Second Professor Shane's argument assumes that African-Ameri-
can children are only vulnerable as a segregated group in segre-
gated schools. To the contrary, as noted by Professor Bell, the
"desire of the white majority to give priority to the interests and
needs of whites over those of Blacks-is as viable and pernicious a
force for harming the hearts and minds of Black children in a ra-
cially-balanced school as it ever was under the pre-Brown 'separate
276. Id at 1043.
277. d
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1084.
280. Professor Shane actually argues that "integration," as opposed to "racial balan-
cing," should be the preferred method to remedy the harm related to dejure segrega-
tion. Racial balancing, the Supreme Court's "preferred remedial strategy," is "the
reassignment of students throughout a public school district to prevent.., the concen-
tration of minority students residing within the district in racially identifiable schools."
Id. at 1092. Moreover, according to Professor Shane, "racial balancing need not imply
significant interracial education unless the racial composition within the district would
permit it." Id. at 1093. Integration on the other hand, refers to "the assignment of
majority and minority pupils in such a way as to assure substantial interracial contact in
each school." Id- As a result, cross-district remedies would be more readily available
under Professor Shane's model than envisioned by the Supreme Court's decision in Mil-
liken II. Id.
281. Id. According to Professor Shane, by creating a minority presence in each
school, integration restructures a school system so as to also help assure that African-
Americans "have some decisionmaking influence throughout the formerly segregated
school district and generates increased confidence that official decisions will take minor-
ity interests into account." Id at 1094.
282. Id. at 1104-27.
283. Id. at 1087-92.
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but equal' system." 28 4 Although African-American children and
white children may not be separated spatially in desegregated
schools, African-American children still can be subjected to discrim-
inatory treatment individually or as subgroups within the desegre-
gated school system.
Discriminatory treatment in desegregated schools takes many
forms-some subtle and some not so subtle. For example, the pub-
lic school system traditionally divides students in "academic track-
ing" groups. According to Jeannie Oakes, "it is dear that in our
multiracial schools minority students were found in disproportion-
ately small percentages in high-track classes and in disproportion-
ately large percentages in low-track classes." 285 The assignment of
students to lower groups is likely "to lower the expectations for his
or her learning" and "may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, with
students achieving only what is expected of them. '28 6 Research also
indicates that African-American children in desegregated suburban
schools are placed in learning disability groupings and classes for
the educably mentally retarded at a significantly higher rate than in
city schools. 287 African-American children may also be subjected to
more personal and individual discrimination in the desegregated
school setting. "Many black children continue to experience isola-
tion, insensitivity, and outright rejection in public schools that may
be perfectly balanced by race but remain dominated by whites. '288
African-American parents have reported serious racial discrimina-
tion against their children by white teachers. 2 9 As a result, "blacks
in desegregated schools may have more anxiety with regard to
achievement because of negative comparisons of themselves with
white students. ' 290 Also, an "extensive review of the literature" has
revealed that "desegregated schools disproportionately discipline
black children."' 29 1 This allegation seems to be supported by fed-
eral litigation challenging discriminatory discipline practice against
African-American children. 292
284. Bell, The Remedy in Brown is Effective Schooling for Black Children, 15 SocIAL. PoLicy
8, 8 (1984).
285. J. OAms, supra note 35, at 67.
286. Id, at 170; see also Chunn, Sorting Black Students for Success and Failure: The Inequity
of Ability Grouping and Tracking, in BLACK EDUCATION: A QUEST FOR E9.urnv AND EXCEL-
LENCE 93 (1989).
287. Rosenbaum, Kulieke & Rubinovitz, Low-Income Black Children in White Suburban
Schools: A Study of School and Student Responses, 56J. NEGRO EDUC. 35, 40 (1987).
288. Bell, Learning From Our Losses: Is School Desegregation Still Feasible in the 1980s, 64
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 572, 575 (1983).
289. Rosenbaum, Kulieke & Rubinowitz, supra note 287, at 40.
290. Ascik, An Investigation of School Desegregation and Its Effects on Black Student Achieve-
ment, 20 AM. EDuc. 15, 18 (1984).
291. Irvine & Irvine, The Impact of the Desegregation Process on the Education of Black Stu-
dents: Key Variables, 52J. NEGRO EDUC. 410, 415 (1983).
292. See Coleman v. Franklin Parish School Bd., 702 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir. 1983)
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Finally, and more importantly, if the harm that remedy for dejure
segregation is supposed to cure is the systematic vulnerability of Af-
rican-Americans in the competition for educational resources, the
harm seems to suggest a remedy different from that proposed by
Professor Shane. In order to assure that African-American children
are not systematically vulnerable to hostile or insensitive treatment,
the most responsive remedy seems to be sanctioning separate but
equal educational districts. In those districts where minority stu-
dents attend schools, the district should be fully controlled by mi-
nority members, with mandatory access to the same educational
resources as the majority students. This Plessy-styled separate-but-
equal remedy, however, was implicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Brown I.
C. Theories Regarding Stigmatic Harms
The stigmatic harm theory293 views the harm resulting from de
jure segregation as an interpretative harm-as opposed to a causal
harm-that results from the meaning attached to segregation by so-
ciety. 294 Dejure segregation is a public symbol of the inferiority of
African-Americans. 295 As such a symbol, racial segregation in pub-
lic schools violates the constitution because such segregation is an
invidious labeling device.296 In other words, through school segre-
gation, the government insults or offends the dignity of the minority
against whom the prejudice is directed. 297 There is no need for evi-
dence to support the proposition that segregation is an insult to Af-
rican-Americans-"we know it."298 The inference drawn from
segregation is unmistakably clear. School desegregation eliminates
the dignitary harm to African-American school children caused by
government action representing stigmatic labelling because it erases
the label that accompanies segregation. 299
(holding that the a plaintiff stated valid cause of action when school authorities inten-
tionally and purposely discriminated against a black child on the basis of race, by striking
the child on the head and creating a serious wound requiring stitches); Sherpell v.
Humnoke School Dist. No. 5, 619 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (striking down an "as-
sertive discipline" program that might have been used as "a protective cover for uncon-
stitutional conduct" by teachers and administrators who possess the disposition to
"shield any racial bias in imposing a discipline against a black child, when in fact there
may by insufficient reasons, or no reason at all to discipline the child").
293. The idea that segregation is unconstitutional because it is racially insulting was
first suggested in the legal academic literature by Professors Black and Cahn. See Black,
supra note, 105; Cahn, supra note 237, at 150.
294. Dworkin, supra note 143, at 21. Stigmatic harm is an abstract harm distinct from
any observable harm. The stigmatic harm arguments, therefore, do not rest on asser-
tions that there is a causal connection between dejure segregation and some observable
harm suffered by African-American school children, such as lowered educational
achievement, feelings of inferiority, or distorted school attendance patterns. Thus these
arguments avoid the difficulty associated with the remedial theories that may need to
draw on social science evidence to justify school desegregation as a remedy.
295. Lawrence, supra note 127, at 26.
296. Id at 24.
297. See Simon, supra note 269, at 1047.
298. Cahn, supra note 238, at 158.
299. See Simon, supra note 269, at 1054.
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The stigmatic harm theory provides an explanation of why sepa-
rate educational facilities are inherently unequal. As with the polit-
ical process explanations, however, it is unclear why racially neutral
remedies alone do not eliminate the stigmatic harm. If the harm is
caused by government action taken with the intent to stigmatize,
such a harm should be eradicated by ensuring that the government
decision is made on a racially neutral basis.300 If government deci-
sions are made on a racially neutral basis, that would seem to elimi-
nate invidious labeling because the decisions are no longer based
upon a stigmatizing motive. The stigmatic harm theory, therefore,
does not explain why the Court compelled racial balancing as part
of the means to remedy the harm of de jure segregation.
III. Invidious Value Inculcation Compared to the Other Theories on
the Harm Resulting from De jure Segregation of Public
Schools
This Part contrasts the theory viewing the harm of de jure segre-
gation as invidious value inculcation with other theories regarding
the harm resulting from de jure segregation. First, invidious value
inculcation theory is contrasted with traditional remedial theories.
The primary difference between invidious value inculcation theory
and remedial theories is disparity in where the theories place the
locus of the harm resulting from de jure segregation. Invidious
value inculcation views the locus of the harm as the value inculcating
process of public schools. Remedial theories generally view the lo-
cus of the harm with African-American school children. Second,
this Part contrasts invidious value inculcation theory with theories
that view the harm of de jure segregation as the embodiment of a
failure in the political process. Political process theories see the lo-
cus of the harm as a distortion of the political process as opposed to
the value inculcating process of public schools. Finally, this Part dis-
cusses the distinction between invidious value inculcation and theo-
ries regarding stigmatic harms. Invidious value inculcation theory is
similar to stigmatic harms theories, except that it views the harm of
de jure segregation of public schools as a sui generis application of
antidiscrimination law.3 0 1
300. The district court in Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955),
reflected this approach when it stated that "[t]he Constitution . . . does not require
integration. It merely forbids discrimination."
301. Invidious value inculcation theory has some parallel with the notion of limits on
government speech articulated by Professor Yudof. Yudofnotes that governments com-
municate through a multitude of acts disseminating information as well as by withhold-
ing information. These acts or omissions have an important impact by influencing the
attitudes and opinions of the populace. Yudof asserts that certain government commu-
nications should be considered ultra vires in the sense that there are certain messages
that government should not disseminate. M. YuDor, supra note 36, at 296-306.
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A. The Remedial Theories
Viewing the harm produced by de jure segregation as invidious
value inculcation is distinguishable from the traditional notions of
remedial theories. Traditional remedial theories are directed at put-
ting the victims of discriminatory conduct into the position that they
would have occupied absent the constitutional violation. The invidi-
ous value inculcating theory asserts that the remedy for dejure seg-
regation is forward-looking, not backward-looking. It is therefore
corrective, as opposed to compensatory. In addition, invidious
value inculcation theory focuses on the distortion caused by dejure
segregation of the value inculcating process of public schools. Un-
like remedial theories, which focus on the victims of discriminatory
conduct, this theory does not assume that de jure segregation pro-
duced some kind of observable harm in African-American school
children. Rather, it views the locus of the harm of de jure segrega-
tion as the value inculcating process of public schools.
The social science evidence relied on by most of the remedial the-
ories regarding the impact of school desegregation on the educa-
tional achievement,30 2 self-esteem,303 or adult life chances3s 4 of
African-Americans is inconclusive. These studies have failed to
prove consistently that desegregating schools produces positive ed-
ucational or psychological benefits for African-Americans. Viewing
the harm produced by de jure segregation as invidious value incul-
cation, however, does not require social science data supporting the
effectiveness of school desegregation as a remedy for alleviating a
condition endemic to African-American school children. Because
the focus of invidious value inculcation theory is its effect on the
value inculcating process, these social science studies are
misdirected.
The remedial theory most analogous to invidious value inculca-
tion theory views the harm resulting from de jure segregation as
producing feelings of inferiority in African-American school chil-
dren. The principal distinction between the two theories is one of
focus. As indicated above, invidious value inculcation views the lo-
cus of the harm as the value inculcating process of public schools.
Feelings of inferiority theory views the locus of the harm as within
African-American school children.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bazemore v. Friday 305 further il-
lustrates this distinction. In Bazemore, the Court ruled that
mandatory racial mixing of children in 4-H and homemaker clubs
was not necessary to eliminate the harm produced by dejure segre-
gation of those clubs.30 6 The state of North Carolina administered
302. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 248.
304. See supra note 268.
305. Bazemore, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
306. Id. at 386.
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agricultural extension programs through the North Carolina Agri-
cultural Extension Service.30 7 In his concurrence, Justice Brennan
noted that the purpose of these programs was "to aid in the dissemi-
nation of 'useful and practical information on subjects relating to
agriculture and home economics.' "308 The Extension Service was a
division of the School of Agriculture and Life Sciences at North Car-
olina State University. Part of the activities sponsored by the Exten-
sion Service included the operation of 4-H and homemaker clubs
for children to learn home economics and other practical skills.3 0 9
Prior to 1965, the Extension Service maintained segregated 4-H
and homemaker clubs. In response to the adoption of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Extension Service discontinued its
mandatory segregated club policy. The Extension Service subse-
quently adopted a number of policies related to the clubs, including
the following: (1) all voluntary clubs must be organized without re-
gard to race; (2) each club must certify that its membership is open
to all persons regardless of race; (3) the Extension Service must in-
struct its agents to encourage the formation of new clubs without
regard to race; (4) the Extension Service must publish its policies in
the media; and (5) the Extension Service 4-11 camps must be fully
integrated.310
The Supreme Court in Bazemore rejected the need for mandatory
racial mixing of the clubs on the ground that there was no current
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,3 11 even though 98.8% of
all homemaker clubs were either all white or all black and in racially
mixed communities 880 single-race 4-H clubs still existed in 1980
compared to 892 single-race clubs in 1972.312 The Court distin-
guished Bazemore from Green3 3 on the ground that racial mixing was
not necessary in Bazemore because, as opposed to the choice of
whether to attend public school, the choice of whether to join a 4-H
or homemaker club is entirely voluntary.3 14 Not only can individu-
als choose which club to join, but they can also choose not to join
any club at all.
This reasoning, however, is unpersuasive. As with Green, in
307. Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., joined by all other Members of the Court, concurring in
part).
308. Id at 388-89.
309. Id at 389.
310. Id at 407 (White, J., concurring).
311. Id at 387-88, 408.
312. Id at 410-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
313. See discussion of Green, supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
314. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 408 (White, J., concurring).
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Bazemore there was little evidence that segregated 4-H and home-
maker clubs were dismantled as a result of voluntary desegrega-
tion. 31 5 Green rested in part upon the notion that if voluntary choice
does not lead to racial mixing of children then it cannot eliminate
the effects of de jure segregation in public schools. It is true that
because of compulsory school attendance statutes, students have to
attend some school. Students, however, have a choice between at-
tending public schools or private schools.A' 6 In Green, students (or
their parents) were also given a choice as to which public school to
attend.3 17 In addition, most state compulsory school attendance
statutes only mandate attendance by children up to age sixteen, and
in some states, only to age fourteen.318 The choice of a student to
attend school beyond the compulsory school attendance age is
therefore as voluntary as the choice of a child to join a particular
4-H or homemaker dub. Yet, the Supreme Court has never sug-
gested that court decrees ordering school desegregation should ex-
clude students that exceed the compulsory school attendance age.
If the Court viewed the constitutional harm produced by de jure
segregation in public schools as the generation of feelings of inferi-
ority in African-American children, then the same concern that led
to mandatory desegregation in public schools should be present
when children join segregated 4-H and homemaker dubs. In order
to remedy this harm, the Court should have ordered mandatory ra-
cial mixing of children in 4-H and homemaker clubs as it did in pub-
lic schools.319
The Court's distinction between 4-H and homemaker clubs in
Bazemore and public schools in Green is better explained by the dis-
tinction between the primary purposes of each institution, not by
reference to compulsory school attendance statutes. Whereas the
purpose of the 4-H and homemaker clubs is the dissemination of
useful information,320 the primary purpose of public schools is the
inculcation of values.32' Racial mixing, while not relevant to dis-
seminating useful information,322 is extremely relevant to inculcat-
ing values.
B. Theories Regarding the Failure of the Political Process
Political process theories view the harm of dejure segregation as
the embodiment of a failure in the political process. The theory of
315. See supra text accompanying note 255.
316. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
317. Green, 391 U.S. at 433-34.
318. W. VALENTE, supra note 79 at 466.
319. Id
320. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 388-89 (Brennan, J., joined by all other Members of the
Court, concurring in part).
321. See supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text.
322. Because the purpose of 4-H and homemaker clubs was to disseminate useful and
practical information, these clubs performed a function similar to the academic function
of public schools. If the Court believed that the academic function of public schools
required desegregation, then it should have mandated desegregation for 4-H and home-
maker clubs.
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invidious value inculcation focuses upon the value inculcating pro-
cess to determine if a violation has occurred. Like the political pro-
cess theories, however, focus on the school officials' actions is
relevant in assessing whether or not a constitutional violation has
occurred. The intentions and actions of school officials are relevant
because they are the ones charged with the responsibility of formu-
lating and implementing the value inculcating process of public
schools.3 23
As discussed earlier, theories that view the harm of dejure segre-
gation as deriving from a corruption of the political process cannot
explain why remedies for the violation include mandatory desegre-
gation of public schools.3 24 Viewing the harm resulting from de
jure segregation as invidious value inculcation, however, focuses
remedies for the harm upon deficiencies in the value inculcating
process as opposed to corruption in the political process. Use of
race-neutral methods, such as making student school assignments
on the basis of neighborhood school attendance policies, would
eliminate the corrupting influence on the political process. Simply
eliminating the corrupting influences of the political process may
not, however, cure the distortion of the value inculcating process.
More than simply racially neutral methods may be required.
C. Theories Regarding Stigmatic Harms
According to the invidious value inculcation theory, the harm to
be eliminated from public schools is also an interpretative harm. In-
vidious value inculcation, therefore, overlaps with theories that view
de jure segregation as producing stigmatic harm. The difference
between these two explanations of the harm resulting from de jure
segregation is that invidious value inculcation is grounded in the
value inculcating function of public education 325 and the stigmatic
harm theory is not. Invidious value inculcation views the harm re-
sulting from dejure segregation as sui generis in antidiscrimination
law because it involves the distortion of the value inculcating pro-
cess of public schools.
The state's stigmatic designation operates differently within the
context of public schools than elsewhere in American society. the
designation of inferiority is presented to children in public schools
which by their very nature are value inculcating institutions.326 The
state is not merely labeling a group as inferior and simply allowing
individuals to accept or reject the label as accurate. Instead, the
323. See supra note 130-35 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 273-74 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 293-300 and accompanying text.
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state is affirmatively attempting to foster a belief in the accuracy of
the label.
As pointed out earlier, other theories resting on notions of stig-
matic harms do not adequately explain why mandatory desegrega-
tion was necessary to remedy the harm.3 27 The remedy being
provided for de jure segregation of public schools is for violations
that take place within the context of a social institution the primary
purpose of which is to inculcate values. Use of race-neutral means
to make school assignments does not eliminate the inculcation of
the value if racial mixing does not occur. The race-neutral assign-
ments that perpetuated racial segregation simply reflected the es-
tablished patterns of behavior, psychology, and belief that were
rooted in the invidious value. The continued racial segregation,
therefore, still operated to inculcate the invidious value. These ra-
cially segregated patterns have to be disestablished before schools
eliminate invidious value inculcation. Therefore, racial mixing is re-
quired as part of the remedy.3 28
IV Issues to Consider in Determining Unitary Status if the Harm
Resulting from Dejure Segregation is Viewed as Invidious
Value Inculcation
If the harm resulting from dejure segregation is viewed as invidi-
ous value inculcation, then determining unitary status requires a
multifaceted examination. This Part proposes, tentatively, a
number of factors in addition to the Green factors which should be
considered by courts in determining whether unitary status has been
achieved.
First, courts should examine the current situation with policymak-
ing school officials, including school board members, superintend-
ents, and other important officials of the school district. The
commitment of these individuals to the elimination of invidious
value inculcation is an important prerequisite to a determination of
unitary status. Courts faced with determining unitary status should
also consider the extent to which these individuals have institution-
alized programs that will insure that public schools will not return to
their old ways.
Second, the courts should examine the extent to which minorities
are represented on school boards or in other prominent school ad-
ministrative offices, and the likelihood that such representation will
continue. Significant representation of minorities in decisionmak-
ing capacities is evidence that the school system has a commitment
to prevent the reinstitution of invidious value inculcation.
Third, courts should consider the good faith of school boards and
other school officials in implementing desegregation decrees.3 29
327. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 283-92 and accompanying text.
329. In Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom., Freeman v.
Pitts, 110 S. Ct. 532 (1989), the First Circuit analyzed three factors to determine
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The cooperation of school officials in eliminating the vestiges of
past discriminatory conduct suggests that the school system has vig-
orously pursued the elimination of invidious value inculcation.
Finally, courts should consider the efforts of school districts to
address racial bias in their traditional educational program. If
schools have engaged in invidious value inculcation, it stands to rea-
son that the other elements of the educational program, especially
the curriculum, also will reflect the invidious value.330 Although a
few federal courts have included a requirement in their desegrega-
tion decrees mandating the elimination of racial bias in the curricu-
lum, 33 1 most courts have not. As noted above,33 2 the complexity of
this issue will require careful consideration by courts.
Courts, however, should react favorably to any systematic effort
by a school district to address racial bias in its traditional educa-
tional program. Although courts should be hesitant about wading
into the traditional educational program in an effort to eliminate in-
vidious value inculcation, it is unlikely that a school system will have
eliminated invidious value inculcation if it has not attempted to ad-
dress racial bias in its traditional educational program. Systematic
efforts by school districts to reduce bias in their (1) teaching strate-
gies; (2) curriculum, textbooks, and other instructional materials;
(3) teacher, staff, and administrator attitudes; and (4) testing proce-
dures should therefore be given significant consideration by federal
courts in determining whether unitary status has been achieved.
Some school districts have recently supplemented their traditional
educational programs with programs that focus specifically on the
cultural heritage of African-Americans from an Afrocentric perspec-
tive.3 33 Under the direction of Dr. Asa Hillard and others, these
school districts have developed supplemental instructional materials
to be used in a number of courses, including math, science, lan-
guage arts, social studies, music, and art, to emphasize the academic
and creative contributions of Africans and African-Americans.33 4 It
whether or not the Boston school system had obtained unitariness with respect to stu-
dent assignments. One of the factors was the good faith of the Boston School Commit-
tee in implementing the court's desegregation plan. Id at 321; see also Jacksonville
Branch, NAACP v. Duvall County School Bd., 883 F.2d 945, 952 (11 th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that a finding of unitary status is inappropriate absent good faith implementation of
a desegregation plan by the school board).
330. See supra notes 260-292 and accompanying text.
331. See Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1014-16 (D. Del. 1978), cert. dnied, 487
U.S. 1206 (1988); Berry v. School Dist., 515 F. Supp. 344, 373-74 (W.D. Mich. 1981),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892 (1983); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 506 F. Supp.
657, 672 (S.D. Ind. 1979).
332. See discussion of Milliken II, supra notes 166-203 and accompanying text.
333. See EDUCATION WEEK 8 (October 18, 1989). These school districts include: At-
lanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; New Orleans, Louisiana; Portland,
Oregon; Indianapolis, Indiana, and the District of Columbia.
334. Id
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should be evident that the schools that have supplemented their ed-
ucational program have taken significant steps toward eliminating
the vestiges of invidious value inculcation that extend beyond the
racial composition of the schools.
Conclusion
With the Supreme Court having granted certiorari in Dowell a35 its
first school desegregation termination case, it is imperative that the
Court have a theory elucidating the constitutional harm resulting
from dejure segregation. Without such a theory it is impossible to
determine when a school system has eliminated the vestiges of de
jure segregation and thus obtained unitary status. School desegre-
gation has been the principal means used to remedy the harm
caused by de jure segregation. Racial balancing in public schools,
however, is no more the goal to be attained by remedying de jure
segregation than racial imbalance was the evil to be remedied. De-
segregation was surely intended to address other concerns.
Public schools are cultural institutions whose primary purpose is
to inculcate values. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence with re-
spect to education was long focused on this value inculcating func-
tion of education. The harm resulting from de jure segregation
should also be viewed from the perspective of the value inculcating
function of public education. From this perspective, the constitu-
tional harm resulting from dejure segregation is invidious value in-
culcation. Segregation of students, teachers, staff, and
administrators along racial lines was an administrative rule that was
the primary component of an educational program designed to in-
culcate a belief in the inferiority of African-Americans.
Notwithstanding the invidious value inculcation attributable to de
jure segregation, many courts that have addressed the issue of uni-
tary status have confined their review to issues related solely to de-
segregation. Although federal courts should review the status of
desegregation in the school districts, other factors are also relevapt
in the determination of whether a school system has obtained uni-
tary status. Remedies for de jure segregation should be viewed as
directed towards the elimination of invidious value inculcation. De-
segregation was the principle means chosen to accomplish this goal.
It should not, however, be viewed as the remedy for the harm. The
remedy for the harm is the elimination of invidious value
inculcation.
As a result, in determining whether unitary status has been ob-
tained, a court should focus on the existence of the invidious value
in the school system. The court should also examine the attitudes of
school officials regarding the school system, and any systematic
changes to the educational program that were adopted by the school
district to eliminate racial bias in the educational program.
335. 677 F. Supp. 1503 (W.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989),
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1521 (1990).
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